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Abstract. Computability logic (CoL) is a recently introduced semantical platform and
ambitious program for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to
the formal theory of truth that logic has more traditionally been. Its expressions represent
interactive computational tasks seen as games played by a machine against the environ-
ment, and “truth” is understood as existence of an algorithmic winning strategy. With
logical operators standing for operations on games, the formalism of CoL is open-ended,
and has already undergone series of extensions. This article extends the expressive power
of CoL in a qualitatively new way, generalizing formulas (to which the earlier languages of
CoL were limited) to circuit-style structures termed cirquents. The latter, unlike formulas,
are able to account for subgame/subtask sharing between different parts of the overall
game/task. Among the many advantages offered by this ability is that it allows us to
capture, refine and generalize the well known independence-friendly logic which, after the
present leap forward, naturally becomes a conservative fragment of CoL, just as classical
logic had been known to be a conservative fragment of the formula-based version of CoL.
Technically, this paper is self-contained, and can be read without any prior familiarity with
CoL.
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1. Introduction
Computability logic (CoL), introduced in [12, 17, 24], is a semantical platform and ambitious
program for redeveloping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal
theory of truth that logic has more traditionally been. Its expressions stand for interactive
computational tasks seen as games played by a machine against its environment, and “truth”
is understood as existence of an effective solution, i.e., of an algorithmic winning strategy.
With this semantics, CoL provides a systematic answer to the fundamental question
“what can be computed?”, just as classical logic is a systematic tool for finding what is true.
Furthermore, as it turns out, in positive cases “what can be computed” always allows itself to
be replaced by “how can be computed”, which makes CoL of potential interest in not only
theoretical computer science, but many more applied areas as well, including interactive
knowledge base systems, resource oriented systems for planning and action, or declarative
programming languages. On the logical side, CoL promises to be an appealing, constructive
and computationally meaningful alternative to classical logic as a basis for applied theories.
The first concrete steps towards realizing this potential have been made very recently in
[26, 29, 30], where CoL-based versions of Peano arithmetic were elaborated. The system
constructed in [26] is an axiomatic theory of effectively solvable number-theoretic problems
(just as the ordinary Peano arithmetic is an axiomatic theory of true number-theoretic
facts); the system constructed in [29] is an axiomatic theory of efficiently solvable (namely,
solvable in polynomial time) number-theoretic problems; in the same style, [30] constructs
systems for polynomial space, elementary recursive, and primitive recursive computabilities.
In all cases, a solution for a problem can be effectively — in fact, efficiently — extracted
from a proof of it in the system, which reduces problem-solving to theorem-proving.
The formalism of CoL is open-ended. It has already undergone series of extensions
([23]-[27]) through introducing logical operators for new, actually or potentially interesting,
operations on games, and this process will probably still continue in the future. The present
work is also devoted to expanding the expressive power of CoL, but in a very different way.
Namely, while the earlier languages of CoL were limited to formulas, this paper makes a
leap forward by generalizing formulas to circuit-style structures termed cirquents. These
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structures, in a very limited form (compared with their present form), were introduced
earlier [16, 22] in the context of the new proof-theoretic approach called cirquent calculus.
Cirquent-based formalisms have significant advantages over formula-based ones, including
exponentially higher efficiency and substantially greater expressive power. Both [16] and
[22] pointed out the possibility and expediency of bringing cirquents into CoL. But a CoL-
semantics for cirquents had never really been set up until now.
Unlike most of its predecessors, from the technical (albeit perhaps not philosophical or
motivational) point of view, the present paper is written without assuming that the reader
is already familiar with the basic concepts and techniques of computability logic. It is
organized as follows.
Section 2 reintroduces the concept of games and interactive computability on which the
semantics of CoL is based. A reader familiar with the basics of CoL may safely skip this
section.
Section 3 introduces the simplest kind of cirquents, containing only the traditional ∨ and
∧ sorts of gates (negation, applied directly to inputs, is also present). These are nothing but
(possibly infinite) Boolean circuits in the usual sense, and the semantics of CoL for them
coincides with the traditional, classical semantics. While such cirquents — when finite
— do not offer higher expressiveness than formulas do, they do offer dramatically higher
efficiency. This fact alone, in our days of logic being increasingly CS-oriented, provides
sufficient motivation for considering a switch from formulas to cirquents in logic, even if we
are only concerned with classical logic. The first steps in this direction have already been
made in [22], where a cirquent-based sound and complete deductive system was set up for
classical logic. That system was shown to provide an exponential speedup of proofs over its
formula-based counterparts.
Each of the subsequent Sections 4-8 conservatively generalizes the cirquents and the
semantics of the preceding sections.
Section 4 strengthens the expressiveness of cirquents by allowing new, so called selec-
tional, sorts of gates, with the latter coming in three — choice ⊔,⊓, sequential ▽,△ and
toggling ∨,∧ — flavors of disjunction and conjunction. Unlike ∨ and ∧ which stand for
parallel combinations of (sub)tasks, selectional gates model decision steps in the process
of interaction of the machine with its environment. Cirquents with such gates, allowing
us to account for the possibility of sharing nontrivial subgames/subtasks, have never been
considered in the past. They, even when finite, are more expressive (let alone efficient) than
formulas with selectional connectives.
Section 5 introduces the idea of clustering selectional gates. Clusters are, in fact,
generalized gates — switch-style devices that permit to select one of several n-tuples of
inputs and connect them, in a parallel fashion, with the n-tuple of outputs, with ordinary
gates being nothing but the special cases of clusters where n = 1. Clustering makes it
possible to express a new kind of sharing, which can be characterized as “sharing children
without sharing grandchildren” — that is, sharing decisions (associated with child gates)
without sharing the results of such decisions (the children of those gates). The ability to
account for this sort of sharing yields a further qualitative increase in the expressiveness of
the associated formalism.
Sections 6 and 7 extend clustering from selectional gates to the traditional sorts ∨,∧
of gates. It turns out that the resulting cirquents — even without selectional gates — are
expressive enough to fully capture the well known and extensively studied independence-
friendly (IF) logic introduced by Hintikka and Sandu [5, 6]. At the same time, cirquents
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with clustered ∨,∧-gates yield substantially higher expressiveness than IF logic does. Due to
this fact, they overcome a series of problems emerging within the earlier known approaches
to IF logic. One of such problems is the inability of the traditional formalisms of IF logic to
account for independence from conjunctions and disjunctions in the same systematic way as
they account for independence from quantifiers. Correspondingly, attempts to develop IF
logic at the purely propositional level have not been able to go beyond certain very limited
and special syntactic fragments of the language. In contrast, our approach saves classical
logic’s nice phenomenon of quantifiers being nothing but “long” conjunctions and disjunc-
tions, so that one can do with the latter everything that can be done with the former, and
vice versa. As a result, we can now (at last) meaningfully talk about propositional IF logic
in the proper sense without any unsettling syntactic restrictions. Another problem arising
with IF logic is the “unplayability” (cf. [34]) of the incomplete-information games tradi-
tionally associated with its formulas, as such games violate certain natural game-theoretic
principles such as perfect recall. Attempts to associate reasonable game-theoretic intuitions
with imperfect-information games typically have to resort to viewing the two parties not as
individual players but rather as teams of cooperating but non-communicating players. This
approach, however, may often get messy, and tends to give rise to series of new sorts of
problems. Va¨a¨na¨nen [37] managed to construct a semantics for IF logic based on perfect-
information games. This, however, made games unplayable for a new reason: moves in
Va¨a¨na¨nen’s games are second-order objects and hence are “unmakable”. Our approach
avoids the need to deal with imperfect-information, second-order-move, or multiple-player
games altogether.
Section 7 also introduces a further generalization of cirquents through what is termed
ranking. Cirquents with ranking (and with only ∨,∧ gates) allow us to further capture the
so called extended IF logic (cf. [35]), but are substantially more expressive than the latter.
They also overcome one notable problem arising in extended IF logic, which is the (weak)
negation’s not being able to act as an ordinary connective that can be meaningfully applied
anywhere within a formula.
Section 8 extends the formalism of cirquents by allowing additional sorts of inputs
termed general, as opposed to the elementary inputs to which the cirquents of the earlier
sections are limited. Unlike elementary inputs that are interpreted just as ⊤ (“true”) or
⊥(“false”), general inputs stand for any, possibly nontrivial, games. This way, cirquents
become and can be viewed as (complex) operations on games, only very few of which are
expressible through formulas.
Section 9 sets up an alternative semantics for cirquents termed abstract resource seman-
tics (ARS). It is a companion and faithful technical assistant of CoL. ARS also has good
claims to be a materialization and generalization of the resource intuitions traditionally —
but somewhat wrongly — associated with linear logic and its variations. Unlike CoL, ARS
has already met cirquents in the past, namely, in [16, 22]. The latter, however, unlike the
present paper, elaborated ARS only for a very limited class of cirquents — cirquents with
just ∨,∧ gates and without clustering or ranking.
Section 10 proves that CoL and ARS validate exactly the same cirquents. Among
the expected applications of this theorem is facilitating soundness/completeness proofs for
various deductive systems for (fragments of) CoL, as technically it is by an order of magni-
tude easier to deal with (the simple and “naive”) ARS than to deal with (the complex and
“serious”) CoL directly.
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2. Games
As noted, computability logic understands interactive computational problems as games
played between two players: machine and environment. The symbolic names for these
two players are ⊤ and ⊥, respectively. ⊤ is a deterministic mechanical device (thus) only
capable of following algorithmic strategies, whereas there are no restrictions on the behavior
of ⊥, which represents a capricious user, the blind forces of nature, or the devil himself.
Our sympathies are with ⊤, and by just saying “won” or “lost” without specifying a player,
we always mean won or lost by ⊤. ℘ is always a variable ranging over {⊤,⊥}, with ¬℘
meaning ℘’s adversary, i.e. the player which is not ℘.
Before getting to a formal definition of games, we agree that a move is always a finite
string over the standard keyboard alphabet. A labeled move (labmove) is a move prefixed
with ⊤ or ⊥, with its prefix (label) indicating which player has made the move. A run
is a (finite or infinite) sequence1 of labmoves, and a position is a finite run. Runs will be
often delimited by “〈” and “〉”, with 〈〉 thus denoting the empty run.
The following is a formal definition of the concept of a game, combined with some less
formal conventions regarding the usage of certain terminology. It should be noted that
the concept of a game considered in CoL is more general than the one defined below, with
games in our present sense called constant games. Since we (for simplicity) only consider
constant games in this paper, we omit the word “constant” and just say “game”.
Definition 2.1. A game is a pair A = (LrA,WnA), where:
1. LrA is a set of runs satisfying the condition that a finite or infinite run is in LrA iff
all of its nonempty finite — not necessarily proper — initial segments are in LrA (notice
that this implies 〈〉 ∈ LrA). The elements of LrA are said to be legal runs of A, and all
other runs are said to be illegal runs of A. We say that α is a legal move for ℘ in a
position Φ of A iff 〈Φ, ℘α〉 ∈ LrA; otherwise α is an illegal move. When the last move of
the shortest illegal initial segment of Γ is ℘-labeled, we say that Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A.
2. WnA is a function that sends every run Γ to one of the players ⊤ or ⊥, satisfying
the condition that if Γ is a ℘-illegal run of A, then WnA〈Γ〉 = ¬℘.2 When WnA〈Γ〉 = ℘,
we say that Γ is a ℘-won (or won by ℘) run of A; otherwise Γ is lost by ℘. Thus, an
illegal run is always lost by the player who has made the first illegal move in it.
It is clear from the above definition that, when defining a particular game A, it would
be sufficient to specify what positions (finite runs) are legal, and what legal runs are won
by ⊤. Such a definition will then uniquely extend to all — including infinite and illegal —
runs. We will implicitly rely on this observation in the sequel.
A game is said to be elementary iff it has no legal runs other than (the always le-
gal) empty run 〈〉. That is, an elementary game is a “game” without any (legal) moves,
automatically won or lost. There are exactly two such games, for which we use the same
symbols ⊤ and ⊥ as for the two players: the game ⊤ automatically won by player ⊤, and
the game ⊥ automatically won by player ⊥.3 Computability logic is a conservative exten-
sion of classical logic, understanding classical propositions as elementary games. And, just
as classical logic, it sees no difference between any two true propositions such as “0 = 0”
1Throughout this paper, by a sequence we mean a κ-sequence for some κ ≤ ω.
2We write WnA〈Γ〉 for WnA(Γ).
3Precisely, we have Wn⊤〈〉 = ⊤ and Wn⊥〈〉 = ⊥.
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and “Snow is white”, and identifies them with the elementary game ⊤; similarly, it treats
false propositions such as “0 = 1” or “Snow is black” as the elementary game ⊥.
The negation ¬A of a game A is understood as the game obtained from A by inter-
changing the roles of the two players, i.e., making ⊤’s (legal) moves and wins ⊥’s moves
and wins, and vice versa. Precisely, let us agree that, for a run Γ, ¬Γ means the result of
changing in Γ each label ⊤ to ⊥ and vice versa. Then:
Definition 2.2. The negation ¬A of a game A is defined by stipulating that, for any run
Γ,
• Γ ∈ Lr¬A iff ¬Γ ∈ LrA;
• Wn¬A〈Γ〉 = ⊤ iff WnA〈¬Γ〉 = ⊥.
Obviously the negation of an elementary game is also elementary. Generally, when applied
to elementary games, the meaning of ¬ fully coincides with its classical meaning. So, ¬ is
a conservative generalization of classical negation from elementary games to all games.
Note the relaxed nature of our games. They do not impose any regulations on when
either player can or should move. This is entirely up to the players. Even if we assume that
illegal moves physically cannot be made, it is still possible that in certain (or all) positions
both of the players have legal moves, and then the next move will be made (if made at all)
by the player who wants or can act sooner. This brings us to the next question to clarify:
how are our games really played, and what does a strategy mean here?
In traditional game-semantical approaches, including those of Lorenzen [31], Hintikka
[4] or Blass [2], player’s strategies are understood as functions— typically as functions from
interaction histories (positions) to moves, or sometimes (Abramsky and Jagadeesan [1]) as
functions that only look at the latest move of the history. This strategies-as-functions
approach, however, is inapplicable in the context of computability logic, whose relaxed
semantics, in striving to get rid of any “bureaucratic pollutants” and only deal with the
remaining true essence of games, has no structural rules and thus does not regulate the
order of moves. As noted, here often either player may have (legal) moves, and then it
is unclear whether the next move should be the one prescribed by ⊤’s strategy function
or the one prescribed by the strategy function of ⊥. In fact, for a game semantics whose
ambition is to provide a comprehensive, natural and direct tool for modeling interactive
computations, the strategies-as-functions approach would be less than adequate, even if
technically possible. This is so for the simple reason that the strategies that real computers
follow are not functions. If the strategy of your personal computer was a function from
the history of interaction with you, then its performance would keep noticeably worsening
due to the need to read the continuously lengthening — and, in fact, practically infinite —
interaction history every time before responding. Fully ignoring that history and looking
only at your latest keystroke in the spirit of [1] is also certainly not what your computer does,
either. The inadequacy of the strategies-as-functions approach becomes especially evident
when one tries to bring computational complexity issues into interactive computation, the
next natural target towards which CoL has already started making its first steps ([?, 29, 30]).
In computability logic, (⊤’s effective) strategies are defined in terms of interactive
machines, where computation is one continuous process interspersed with — and influenced
by — multiple “input” (environment’s moves) and “output” (machine’s moves) events. Of
several, seemingly rather different yet equivalent, machine models of interactive computation
studied in CoL, here we will consider the most basic, HPM (“Hard-Play Machine”) model.
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An HPM is nothing but a Turing machine with the additional capability of making
moves. The adversary can also move at any time, with such moves being the only nondeter-
ministic events from the machine’s perspective. Along with the ordinary read/write work
tape, the machine also has an additional tape4 called the run tape. The latter, at any time,
spells the “current position” of the play. The role of this tape is to make the interaction
history fully visible to the machine. It is read-only, and its content is automatically updated
every time either player makes a move.
In these terms, an algorithmic solution (⊤’s winning strategy) for a given game
A is understood as an HPM M such that, no matter how the environment acts during its
interaction with M (what moves it makes and when), the run incrementally spelled on the
run tape is a ⊤-won run of A. When this is the case, we say that M wins, or solves, A,
and that A is a computable, or algorithmically solvable, game.
As for ⊥’s strategies, there is no need to define them: all possible behaviors by ⊥ are
accounted for by the different possible nondeterministic updates of the run tape of an HPM.
In the above outline, we described HPMs in a relaxed fashion, without being specific
about technical details such as, say, how, exactly, moves are made by the machine, how
many moves either player can make at once, what happens if both players attempt to move
“simultaneously”, etc. As it turns out (cf. [12]), all reasonable design choices yield the same
class of winnable games as long as we consider a certain natural subclass of games called
static.
Intuitively, static games are interactive tasks where the relative speeds of the players
are irrelevant, as it never hurts a player to postpone making moves. In other words, they are
games that are contests of intellect rather than contests of speed. And one of the theses that
computability logic philosophically relies on is that static games present an adequate formal
counterpart of our intuitive concept of “pure”, speed-independent interactive computational
problems. Correspondingly, computability logic restricts its attention (more specifically,
possible interpretations of the atoms of its formal language) to static games. Below comes
a formal definition of this concept.
For either player ℘, we say that a run Υ is a ℘-delay of a run Γ iff:
• for both players ℘′ ∈ {⊤,⊥}, the subsequence of ℘′-labeled moves of Υ is the same as
that of Γ, and
• for any n, k ≥ 1, if the nth ℘-labeled move is made later than (is to the right of) the kth
¬℘-labeled move in Γ, then so is it in Υ.
The above conditions mean that in Υ each player has made the same sequence of moves as
in Γ, only, in Υ, ℘ might have been acting with some delay.
Let us say that a run is ℘-legal iff it is not ℘-illegal. That is, a ℘-legal run is either
simply legal, or the player responsible for (first) making it illegal is ¬℘ rather than ℘.
Now, we say that a game A is static iff, whenever a run Υ is a ℘-delay of a run Γ, we
have:
• if Γ is a ℘-legal run of A, then so is Υ;5
4An HPM often also has a third tape called the valuation tape. Its function is to provide values for the
variables on which a game may depend. However, as we remember, in this paper we only consider constant
games — games that do not depend on any variables. This makes it possible to safely remove the valuation
tape from the HPM model (or leave it there but fully ignore), as this tape is no longer relevant.
5In most papers on CoL, the concept of static games is defined without this (first) condition. In such
cases, however, the existence of an always-illegal move ♠ is stipulated in the definition of games. The first
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• if Γ is a ℘-won run of A, then so is Υ.
The class of static games is closed under all game operations studied in CoL, and all games
that we shall see in this paper are static. Throughout this paper, we use the term “com-
putational problem”, or simply “problem”, is a synonym of “static game”.
A simplest example of a non-static game would be the game where all moves are legal,
and which is won by the player who moves first. The chances of a player to succeed
only depend on its relative speed, that is. Such a game hardly represents any meaningful
computational problem.
3. The simplest kind of cirquents
We fix some infinite collection of finite alphanumeric expressions called atoms, and use p,
q, r, s, p1, p2, p(3, 6), q7(1, 1, 8), . . . as metavariables for them. If p is an atom, then the
expressions p and ¬p are said to be literals.
Let us agree that, in this section, by a graph we mean a directed acyclic multigraph
with countably many nodes and edges, where the outgoing edges of each node are arranged
in a fixed left-to-right order (edges #1, #2, etc.), and where each node is labeled with either
a literal or ∨ or ∧. Since the sets of nodes and edges are countable, we assume that they
are always subsets of {1, 2, 3, . . .}. For a node n of the graph, the string representing n in
the standard decimal notation is said to be the ID number, or just the ID, of the node.
Similarly for edges.
The nodes labeled with ∧ or ∨ we call gates, and the nodes labeled with literals we call
ports. Specifically, a node labeled with a literal L is said to be a an L-port; a ∧-labeled
node is said to be a ∧-gate; and a ∨-labeled node is said to be a ∨-gate. When there is
an edge from a node a to a node b, we say that b is a child of a and a is a parent of b.
The relations “descendant” and “ancestor” are the transitive closures of the relations
“child” and “parent”, respectively. The meanings of some other standard relations such as
“grandchild”, “grandparent”, etc. should also be clear.
The outdegree of a node of a graph is the quantity of outgoing edges of that node,
which can be finite or infinite. Since there are only countably many edges, any two infinite
outdegrees are equal. Similarly, the indegree of a node is the quantity of the incoming
edges of that node.
We say that a graph is well-founded iff there is no infinite sequence a1, a2, a3, . . . of
nodes where each ai is a predecessor of ai+1. Of course, any (directed acyclic) graph with
finitely many nodes is well-founded.
We say that a graph is effective iff the following basic predicates and partial functions
characterizing it are recursive: “x is a node”, “x is an edge”, “the label of node x”, “the
outdegree of node x”, “the y’th outgoing edge of node x”, “the origin of edge x”, “the
destination of edge x”.
Definition 3.1. A cirquent is an effective, well-founded graph satisfying the following two
conditions:
(1) Ports have no children.
(2) There is a node, called the root, which is an ancestor of all other nodes in the graph.
condition of our present definition of static games turns out to be simply derivable from that stipulation.
This and a couple of other minor technical differences between our present formulations from those given in
other pieces of literature on CoL only signify presentational and by no means conceptual variations.
FROM FORMULAS TO CIRQUENTS IN COMPUTABILITY LOGIC 9
We say that a cirquent is finite iff it has only finitely many edges (and hence nodes);
otherwise it is infinite.
We say that a cirquent is tree-like iff the indegree of each of its non-root node is 1.
Graphically, we represent ports through the corresponding literals, ∨-gates through ∨-
inscribed circles, and ∧-gates through ∧-inscribed circles. We agree that the direction of
an edge is always upward, which allows us to draw lines rather than arrows for edges. It
is understood that the official order of the outgoing edges of a gate coincides with the (left
to right) order in which the edges are drawn. Also, typically we do not indicate the IDs of
nodes unless necessary. In most cases, what particular IDs are assigned to the nodes of a
cirquent is irrelevant and such an assignment can be chosen arbitrarily. Similarly, edge IDs
are usually irrelevant, and they will never be indicated.
Below are a few examples of cirquents. Note that cirquents may contain parallel edges,
as we agreed that “graph” means “multigraph”. Note also that not only ports but also
gates can be childless.
¬p p
❅ ❦∨
¬p p
❅ ❦∨¬p p
◗
◗
◗
✑
✑
✑
❳❳❳
❳❳❳
❳❳
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘
❦∧
¬p p
❅
❅
 
 
❦∨
❦∧
 ❅
Figure 1: Finite cirquents
p(1, 1) p(1, 2) . . .
✏✏
✏✏
✭✭✭ . . .❦∨
p(2, 1) p(2, 2) . . .
✏✏
✏✏
✭✭✭ . . .❦∨
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭
❦∧
. . .
. . .
❦∨
❦∨
❅
❦∨
❜
❦∨❳ ❤
✁
✁
✁✁
✧
✧
✧✧
✏✏
✏✏
✏✏
✭✭✭✭❦∨
. . .
. . .
p1 p2 p3 . . .
. . .
Figure 2: Infinite cirquents
By an interpretation6 in this and the following few sections we mean a function ∗ that
sends each atom p to one of the values (elementary games) p∗ ∈ {⊤,⊥}. It immediately
extends to a mapping from all literals to {⊤,⊥} by stipulating that (¬p)∗ = ¬(p∗); that is,
∗ sends ¬p to ⊤ iff it sends p to ⊥.
Each interpretation ∗ induces the predicate of truth with respect to (w.r.t.) ∗ for
cirquents and their nodes, as defined below. This definition, as well as similar definitions
given later, silently but essentially relies on the fact that the graphs that we consider are
well-founded.
Definition 3.2. Let C be a cirquent and ∗ an interpretation. With “port” and “gate”
below meaning those of C, and “true” to be read as “true w.r.t. ∗”, we say that:
6This concepts is termed “perfect interpretation” in the other pieces of literature on CoL, where the
word “interpretation” is reserved for a slightly more general concept. Since we only deal with perfect
interpretations in this paper, we omit the word “perfect” and just say “interpretation”.
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• An L-port is true iff L∗ = ⊤ (any literal L).
• A ∨-gate is true iff so is at least one of its children (thus, a childless ∨-gate is never true).
• A ∧-gate is true iff so are all of its children (thus, a childless ∧-gate is always true).
Finally, we say that the cirquent C is true iff so is its root.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a cirquent and ∗ an interpretation. We define C∗ to be the
elementary game the (only) legal run 〈〉 of which is won by ⊤ iff C is true w.r.t. ∗.
Thus, every interpretation ∗ “interprets” a cirquent C as one of the elementary games ⊤
or ⊥. This will not necessarily be the case for the more general sorts of cirquents introduced
in later sections though.
We say that two cirquents C1 and C2 are extensionally identical iff, for every inter-
pretation ∗, C∗1 = C
∗
2 . For instance, the two cirquents of Figure 1 are extensionally identical.
Occasionally we may say “equivalent” instead of “extensionally identical”, even though one
should remember that equivalence often (in other pieces of literature) may mean something
weaker than extensional identity.
It should be pointed out that the above definition of extensional identity applies not
only to cirquents in the sense of the present section. It extends, without any changes in
phrasing, to cirquents in the more general sense of any of the subsequent sections of this
paper as well.
Finally, we say that a cirquent C is valid iff, for any interpretation ∗, C∗ = ⊤.
Obviously the semantics that we have defined in this section is nothing but the kind
old semantics of classical logic. Computability logic fully agrees with and adopts the latter.
This is exactly what makes computability logic a conservative extension of classical logic.
Let us agree that, whenever we speak about formulas of classical logic, they are assumed
to be written in negation normal form, that is, in the form where the negation symbol ¬
is only applied to atoms. If an expression violates this condition, it is to be understood
just as a standard abbreviation. Similarly, if we write E → F , it is to be understood as
an abbreviation of ¬E ∨ E. Also, slightly deviating from the tradition, we allow any finite
numbers of arguments for conjunctions and disjunctions in classical formulas. The symbol
⊤ will be understood as an abbreviation of the empty conjunction, ⊥ as an abbreviation of
the empty disjunction, the expression ∧{E} will be used for the conjunction whose single
conjunct is E, and similarly for ∨{E}. More generally, for any n ≥ 0, ∧{E1, . . . , En} can
(but not necessarily will) be written instead of E1∧. . .∧En, and similarly for ∨{E1, . . . , En}.
Every formula of classical propositional logic then can and will be seen as a finite tree-
like cirquent, namely, the cirquent which is nothing but the parse tree for that formula. For
instance, we shall understand the formula ¬p ∧ (¬p ∨ p) ∧ (¬p ∨ p) ∧ p as the left cirquent
of Figure 1.
Every finite — not necessarily tree-like — cirquent can also be translated into an
equivalent formula of classical propositional logic. This can be done by first turning the
cirquent into an extensionally identical tree-like cirquent by duplicating and separating
shared nodes, and then writing the formula whose parse tree such a cirquent is. For instance,
applying this procedure to the right cirquent of Figure 1 turns it into the left cirquent of
the same figure and thus the formula ¬p ∧ (¬p ∨ p) ∧ (¬p ∨ p) ∧ p.
Without loss of generality, we assume that, unless otherwise specified, the universe of
discourse in all cases that we consider — i.e., the set over which the variables of classical first
order logic range — is {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Then, from the perspective of classical first order logic,
the universal quantification of E(x) is nothing but the “long conjunction” E(1) ∧ E(2) ∧
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E(3) ∧ . . ., and the existential quantification of E(x) is nothing but the “long disjunction”
E(1) ∨ E(2) ∨ E(3) ∨ . . .. To emphasize this connection, let us agree to use the expression
∧xE(x) for the former and ∨xE(x) for the latter, instead of the more usual ∀xE(x)
and ∃xE(x) (computability logic reserves ∀x and ∃x for another, so called blind, sort of
quantifiers; semantically they, just like ∧x and ∨x, are conservative generalizations of the
classical quantifiers).
Since quantifiers are conjunctions or disjunctions, it is obvious that all formulas of
classical first order logic can also be seen as tree-like (albeit no longer finite) cirquents. For
instance, the formula ∧x∨y p(x, y) is nothing but the left cirquent of Figure 2.
On the other hand, unlike the case with finite cirquents, obviously not all infinite
cirquents can be directly and adequately translated into formulas of classical logic. Of
course, the great expressive power achieved by infinite cirquents, by itself, does not mean
much, because such cirquents are generally “unwritable” or “undrawable”. The cirquents of
Figure 2 are among the not many lucky exceptions, but even there, the usage of the ellipsis is
very informal, relying on a human reader’s ability to see patterns and generalize. In order
to take advantage of the expressiveness of cirquents, one needs to introduce notational
conventions allowing to represent certain infinite patterns and (sub)cirquents through finite
means. The quantifiers ∧x and ∨x are among such means. Defining new, ever more
expressive means (not reducible to ∧x,∨x) is certainly possible. Among the advantages of
considering all — rather than only finitely represented — cirquents as we do in this paper
is that a semantics for them has to be set up only once. If and when various abbreviations
and finite means of expression are introduced, one will only need to explain what kinds
of cirquents or subcirquents they stand for, without otherwise redefining or extending the
already agreed-upon general semantics for cirquents.
But higher expressiveness is not the only advantage of cirquents over formulas. Another
very serious advantage is the higher efficiency of cirquents. Let us for now talk only about
finite cirquents. As we know, all such cirquents can be written as formulas of classical
propositional logic. So, they do not offer any additional expressive power. But they do
offer dramatically improved efficiency in representing Boolean functions. In Section 8 of
[22] one can find examples of naturally emerging sets of Boolean functions which can be
represented through polynomial size cirquents but require exponential sizes if represented
through formulas. The higher efficiency of cirquents is achieved due to the possibility to
share children between different parents — the mechanism absent in formulas, because of
which an exponential explosion may easily occur when translating a (non-tree-like) cirquent
into an equivalent formula. Imagine where the computer industry would be at present if, for
some strange reason, the computer engineers had insisted on tree-like (rather than graph-
like) circuitries!
Cirquents offer not only improved efficiency of expression, but also improved efficiency
of proofs in deductive systems. In [22], a cirquent-based analytic deductive system CL8
for classical propositional logic is set up which is shown to yield an exponential improve-
ment (over formula-based analytic deductive systems) in proof efficiency. For instance, the
notorious propositional Pigeonhole principle, which is known to have no polynomial size
analytic proofs in traditional systems, has been shown to have such proofs in CL8
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4. Selectional gates
We now start a series of generalizations for cirquents and their semantics. We agree that,
throughout the rest of this paper, unless otherwise specified, “cirquent” and all related
terms are always to be understood in their latest, most general, sense.
In this section we extend the concept of cirquents defined in the previous section
by allowing, along with ∨ and ∧, the following six additional possible labels for gates:
∨,∧,▽,△,⊔,⊓. Gates labeled with any of these new symbols we call selectional gates.
And gates labeled with the old ∨ or ∧ we call parallel gates.
Selectional gates, in turn, are subdivided into three groups:
• {∨,∧}, referred to as toggling gates;
• {▽,△}, referred to as sequential gates;
• {⊔,⊓}, referred to as choice gates.
The eight kinds of gates are also divided into the following two groups:
• {∨,∨,▽,⊔}, termed disjunctive gates (or simply disjunctions);
• {∧,∧,△,⊓}, termed conjunctive gates (or simply conjunctions).
Thus, ∧ is to be referred to as “parallel conjunction”, ⊔ as “choice disjunction”, etc.
The same eight symbols can be used to construct formulas in the standard way. Of
course, in the context of formulas, these symbols will be referred to as operators or con-
nectives rather than as gates. Formulas of computability logic accordingly may also use
eight sorts of quantifiers. They are written as symbols of the same shape as the corre-
sponding connectives, but in a larger size. Two of such quantifiers — ∧x and ∨x — have
already been explained in the previous section. The remaining quantifiers are understood
in the same way: ⊓xE(x) is the infinite choice conjunction E(1) ⊓ E(2) ⊓ . . ., ⊔xE(x)
is the infinite choice disjunction E(1) ⊔ E(2) ⊔ . . ., and similarly for ∧,∨,△,▽. Since
quantifiers are again nothing but “long” conjunctions and disjunctions, as pointed out in
the previous section, there is no necessity to have special gates for them, as our approach
that permits gates with infinite outdegrees covers them all. For similar reasons, there is no
necessity to have special gates for what computability logic calls (co)recurrence operators.
The parallel recurrence ∧|E of E is defined as the infinite parallel conjunction E ∧ E ∧ . . .,
the parallel corecurrence ∨|E of E is defined as the infinite parallel disjunction E ∨ E ∨ . . .,
and similarly for toggling recurrence ∧| , toggling corecurrence ∨| , sequential recurrence −∧
| and
sequential corecurrence
−∨| (choice recurrence and corecurrence are not considered because,
semantically, both E ⊓E ⊓ . . . and E ⊔ E ⊔ . . . are simply equivalent to E).
All of the operators ∨,∧,∨,∧,▽,△,⊔,⊓, including their quantifier and recurrence ver-
sions, have been already motivated, defined and studied in computability logic. This, how-
ever, has been done only in the context of formulas. In this paper we extend the earlier
approach and concepts of computability logic from formulas to cirquents as generalized
formulas.
As before, an interpretation is an assignment ∗ of ⊤ or ⊥ to each atom, extended to all
literals by commuting with ¬. And, as before, such an assignment induces a mapping that
sends each cirquent C to a game C∗. When C is a cirquent in the sense of the previous
section, C∗ is always an elementary game (⊤ or ⊥). When, however, C contains selectional
gates, the game C∗ is no longer elementary.
To define such games C∗, let us agree that, throughout this paper, positive integers
are identified with their decimal representations, so that, when we say “number n”, we
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may mean either the number n as an abstract object, or the string that represents n in
the decimal notation. Among the benefits of this convention is that it allows us to identify
nodes of a cirquent with their IDs.
Definition 4.1. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, and Φ a position. Φ is a legal
position of the game C∗ iff, with a “gate” below meaning a gate of C, the following
conditions are satisfied:
(1) Each labmove of Φ has one of the following forms:
(a) ⊤g.i, where g is a ∨-, ▽- or ⊔-gate and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of g;
(b) ⊥g.i, where g is a ∧-, △- or ⊓-gate and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of g.
(2) Whenever g is a choice gate, Φ contains at most one occurrence of a labmove of the
form ℘g.i.
(3) Whenever g is a sequential gate and Φ is of the form 〈. . . , ℘g.i, . . . , ℘g.j, . . .〉, we have
i < j.
Note that the set of legal runs of C∗ does not depend on ∗. Hence, in the sequel, we can
unambiguously omit “∗” and simply say “legal run of C”.
The intuitive meaning of a move of the form g.i is selecting the ith outgoing edge —
together with the child pointed at by such an edge — of (in) the selectional gate g. In a
disjunctive selectional gate, a selection is always made by player ⊤; and in a conjunctive
selectional gate, a selection is always made by player ⊥. The difference between the three
types of selectional gates is only in how many selections and in what order are allowed to be
made in the same gate. In a choice gate, a selection can be made only once. In a sequential
gate, selections can be reconsidered any number of times, but only in the left-to-right order
(once an edge #i is selected, no edge #j with j ≤ i can be (re)selected afterwards). In a
toggling gate, selections can be reconsidered any number of times and in any order. This
includes the possibility to select the same edge over and over again.
Definition 4.2. In the context of a given cirquent C and a legal run Γ of C, we will say
that a selectional gate g is unresolved iff either no moves of the form g.j have been made
in Γ, or infinitely many such moves have been made.7 Otherwise g is resolved and, where
g.i is the last move of the form g.j made in Γ, the child pointed at by the ith outgoing edge
of g is said to be the resolvent of g.
Intuitively, the resolvent is the “final”, or “ultimate” selection of a child made in gate
g by the corresponding player. There is no such “ultimate” selection in unresolved gates.
The following definition conservatively generalizes Definition 3.2 of truth. Now we have
a legal run Γ of the cirquent as an additional parameter, which was trivial (namely, Γ = 〈〉)
in Definition 3.2 and hence not mentioned there.
Definition 4.3. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, and Γ a legal run of C. In this
context, with “true” to be read as “true w.r.t. (∗,Γ)”, we say that:
• An L-port is true iff L∗ = ⊤.
• A ∨-gate is true iff so is at least one of its children.
• A ∧-gate is true iff so are all of its children.
7The latter, of course, may not be the case if g is a choice gate, or a sequential gate with a finite outdegree.
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• A resolved selectional gate is true iff so is its resolvent.
• No unresolved disjunctive selectional gate is true.
• Each unresolved conjunctive selectional gate is true.
Finally, we say that C is true iff so is its root.
As we just did in the above definition, when ∗ and Γ are fixed in a context or are
otherwise irrelevant, we may omit “w.r.t. (∗,Γ)” and just say “true”.
Definition 4.4. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, and Γ a legal run of C. Then Γ
is a ⊤-won run of the game C∗ iff C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ).
Definitions 4.1 and 4.4, together, provide a definition of the game C∗, for any cirquent
C and interpretation ∗. To such a game C∗ we may refer as “the game represented by C
under interpretation ∗”, or as “C under interpretation ∗”, or — when ∗ is fixed or irrelevant
— as “the game represented by C”. We may also say that “∗ interprets C as C∗”. Similarly
for atoms and literals instead of cirquents. Also, in informal contexts we may identify a
cirquent C or a literal L with a (the) game represented by it, and write C or L where,
strictly speaking, C∗ or L∗ is meant. These and similar terminological conventions apply
not only to the present section, but the rest of the paper as well.
We now need to generalize the definition of validity given in the previous section to
cirquents in the sense of the present section. As it turns out, such a generalization can be
made in two, equally natural, ways:
Definition 4.5. Let C be a cirquent in the sense of the present or any of the subsequent
sections. We say that:
medskip
1. C is weakly valid iff, for any interpretation ∗, there is an HPM M such that M
wins the game C∗.
2. C is strongly valid iff there is an HPM M such that, for any interpretation ∗, M
wins the game C∗.
When M and C satisfy the second clause of the above definition, we say that M
is a uniform solution for C. Intuitively, a uniform solution M for a cirquent C is an
interpretation-independent winning strategy: since the “intended” or “actual” interpreta-
tion ∗ is not visible to the machine, M has to play in some standard, uniform way that
would be successful for any possible interpretation of C. To put it in other words, a uniform
solution is a purely logical solution, which is based only on the form of a cirquent rather
than any extra-logical meaning (interpretation) we have or could have associated with it.
It is obvious that for cirquents of the previous section, the weak and strong forms of
validity coincide with what we simply called “validity” there. In general, however, not every
weakly valid cirquent would also be strongly valid. A simplest example of such a weakly
valid cirquent is ¬p⊔ p.8 Under any interpretation ∗, the game represented by this cirquent
is won by one of the two HPMs M1 or M2, where M1 is the machine that selects the
left disjunct and rests, while M2 is the machine that selects the right disjunct and rests.
However, which of these two machines wins the game depends on whether ∗ interprets p as ⊥
8If, however, we do not limit our considerations to perfect interpretations (see the footnote on page 9)
and allow all interpretations in the definition of weak validity, this cirquent will no longer be weakly valid.
In fact, for all well studied fragments of CoL, when interpretations are not required to be perfect, the weak
and the strong versions of validity have been shown to yield the same classes of formulas. Strong validity in
the CoL literature is usually referred to as uniform validity, and weak validity as (simply) validity.
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or ⊤. In general, there is no one machine that wins the game for any possible interpretation.
That is, the cirquent ¬p ⊔ p has no uniform solution, and thus it is not strongly valid.
Which of the two versions of validity is more interesting depends on the motivational
standpoint. Weak validity tells us what can be computed in principle. So, a computability-
theoretician would focus on this concept. On the other hand, it is strong rather than weak
validity that would be of interest in all application areas of CoL. There we want a logic on
which a universal problem-solving machine can be based. Such a machine would or should
be able to solve problems represented by logical expressions without any specific knowledge
of the meanings of their atoms, i.e. without knowledge of the actual interpretation, which
may vary from situation to situation or from application to application. Strong validity is
exactly what fits the bill in this case. Throughout this paper, our primary focus will be on
strong rather than weak validity.
To appreciate the difference between the parallel and choice groups of gates or connec-
tives, let us compare the two cirquents of Figure 3.
¬p(1) p(1)
❅ ❦∨
¬p(2) p(2)
❅ ❦∨
¬p(3) p(3)
❅ ❦∨
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭
❦∧
. . .
∧x
(
¬p(x) ∨ p(x)
)
¬p(1) p(1)
❅ ❦⊔
¬p(2) p(2)
❅ ❦⊔
¬p(3) p(3)
❅ ❦⊔
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭
❦⊓
. . .
⊓x
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
)
Figure 3: Parallel versus choice gates
The game represented by the left cirquent of Figure 3 is elementary, where no moves can
or should be made by either player. It is also easy to see that this game (the only legal
run 〈〉 of it, that is) is automatically won by ⊤, no matter what interpretation ∗ is applied,
so, it is both weakly and strongly valid. On the other hand, the game represented by the
right cirquent of the same figure is not elementary. And it is neither strongly valid nor
weakly valid. A legal move by ⊥ in this game consists in selecting one of the infinitely
many outgoing edges (and hence children) of the root, intuitively corresponding to choosing
a value for x in the formula ⊓x
(
¬p(x) ⊔ p(x)
)
. And a(ny) legal move by ⊤ consists in
selecting one of the two outgoing edges (and hence children) of one of the ⊔-gates. Making
more than one selection in the same choice (unlike toggling or sequential) gate is not allowed,
so that a selection automatically also is the resolvent of the gate. The overall game is won
by ⊤ iff either ⊥ failed to make a selection in the root, or else, where i is the outgoing edge
of the root selected by ⊥ and ai is the corresponding (ith, that is) child of the root, either
(1) ⊤ has selected the left outgoing edge of ai and ¬p(i) is true, or (2) ⊤ has selected the
right outgoing edge of ai and p(i) is true. There are no conditions on when the available
moves should be made, and generally they can be made by either player at any time and in
any order. So, in the present example, ⊤ can legally make selections in several or even all
⊔-gates. But, of course, a reasonable strategy for ⊤ is to first wait till ⊥ resolves the root
(otherwise ⊤ wins), and then focus only on the resolvent of the root (what happens in the
other ⊔-gates no longer matters), trying to select the true child of it.
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From the above explanation it should be clear that the right cirquent of Figure 3
expresses the problem of deciding (in the traditional sense) the predicate p(x). That is,
under any given interpretation ∗, the game represented by that cirquent has an algorithmic
winning strategy by ⊤ if and only if the predicate
(
p(x)
)∗
— which we simply write as p(x)
— is decidable. As not all predicates are decidable, the cirquent is not weakly valid, let
alone being strongly valid.
To get a feel for sequential and toggling gates, let us look at Figure 4.
¬p(1) p(1)
❅ ❦▽
¬p(2) p(2)
❅ ❦▽
¬p(3) p(3)
❅ ❦▽
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
✭
❦⊓
. . .
⊓x
(
¬p(x)▽ p(x)
)
¬p(1) p(1)
❅ ❦∨
¬p(2) p(2)
❅ ❦∨
¬p(3) p(3)
❅ ❦∨
✟✟
✟✟
✟✟
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘✘✘
✘
✭✭✭✭
✭✭✭✭
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✭
❦⊓
. . .
⊓x
(
¬p(x)∨ p(x)
)
Figure 4: Sequential versus toggling gates
The cirquents of Figure 4 look similar to the right cirquent of Figure 3. And the latter, as
we know, represents the problem of deciding p(x). Then what are the problems represented
by the cirquents of Figure 4?
The left cirquent of Figure 4 represents the problem of semideciding p(x). That is,
under any given interpretation, the game represented by this cirquent is computable if and
only if the predicate p(x) is semidecidable (recursively enumerable). Indeed, suppose p(x)
is semidecidable. Then an algorithmic winning strategy for the game represented by the
cirquent goes like this. Wait till the environment selects the ith child ai of the root for some
i. Then select the left child of ai, after which start looking for a certificate of the truth of
p(i). If and when such a certificate is found, select the right child of ai, and rest your case.
It is obvious that this strategy indeed wins. For the opposite direction, suppose M is an
HPM that wins the game represented by the cirquent. Then a semidecision procedure for
the predicate p(x) goes like this. After receiving an input i, simulate the work of M in the
scenario where, at the beginning of the play, the environment selected the ith child ai of the
root. If and when you see in this simulation that M selected the right child of ai, accept
the input.
As for the right cirquent of Figure 4, it also represents a decision-style problem, which
is further weaker than the problem of semideciding p(x). This problem is known in the
literature as recursive approximation (cf. [3], Definition 8.3.9). Recursively approximating
p(x) means telling whether p(x) is true or not, but doing so in the same style as semidecid-
ing does in negative cases: by correctly saying “Yes” or “No” at some point (after perhaps
taking back previous answers several times) and never reconsidering this answer afterwards.
Observe that semideciding p(x) can be seen as always saying “No” at the beginning and
then, if this answer is incorrect, changing it to “Yes” at some later time; so, when the an-
swer is negative, this will be expressed by saying “No” and never taking back this answer,
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yet without ever indicating that the answer is final and will not change.9 Thus, the dif-
ference between semideciding and recursively approximating is that, unlike a semidecision
procedure, a recursive approximation procedure can reconsider both negative and positive
answers, and do so several times rather than only once. In perhaps more familiar terms, ac-
cording to Shoenfield’s Limit Lemma (Cf. [3], Lemma 8.3.12), a predicate p(x) is recursively
approximable (the problem of its recursive approximation has an algorithmic solution) iff
p(x) is of arithmetical complexity ∆2, i.e., both p(x) and its negation can be written in the
form ∃z∀ys(z, y, x), where s(z, y, x) is a decidable predicate.
We could go on and on illustrating how our formalism — even at the formula level —
makes it possible to express various known and unknown natural and interesting properties,
relations and operations on predicates or games as generalized predicates, but this can
take us too far. Plenty of examples and discussions in that style can be found in, say,
[12, 23, 24, 27]. Here we only want to point out the difference between our treatment
of ∨,∧ (including quantifiers as infinite versions of ∨,∧) and the more traditional game-
semantical approaches, most notably that of Hintikka’s [4] game-theoretic semantics. The
latter essentially treats ∨,∧ as we treat ⊔,⊓— namely, associates ⊤’s moves/choices with ∨
and ⊥’s moves/choices with ∧. Computability logic, on the other hand, in the style used by
Blass [2] for the multiplicatives of linear logic, treats A∨B and A∧B as parallel combinations
of games: these are simultaneous plays on “two boards” (within the two components). In
order to win A ∧ B, ⊤ needs to win in both components, while in order to win A ∨ B, it
is sufficient for ⊤ to win in just one component. No choice between A and B is expected
to be made at any time by either player. Note that otherwise strong validity would not at
all be an interesting concept: there would be no strongly valid cirquents except for some
pathological cases such as the cirquent whose root is a childless conjunctive gate.
Another crucial difference between our approach and that of Hintikka, as well as the
approach of Blass, is that we insist on the effectiveness of strategies while the latter allow
any strategies. It is not hard to see that, if we allowed any (rather than only algorithmic)
strategies, the system of our gates would semantically collapse to merely the parallel group.
That is, a cirquent C (under whatever interpretation) would have a winning strategy by ⊤
if and only if C ′ does, where C ′ is the result of replacing in C every disjunctive selectional
gate by ∨ and every conjunctive selectional gate by ∧.
Anyway, an important issue for the present paper is that of the advantages of cirquents
over formulas. As we remember, finite cirquents without selectional gates are more efficient
tools of expression than formulas of classical logic are, but otherwise their expressive power
is the same as that of formulas. How about finite cirquents in the more general sense of this
section — ones containing selectional gates? In this case, finite (let alone infinite) cirquents
are not only more efficient but also more expressive than formulas. To get some insights,
let us look at Figure 5.
9Unless, of course, the procedure halts by good luck. Halting without saying “Yes” can then be seen as
an explicit indication that the original answer “No” was final.
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p q
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Figure 5: Unshared versus shared gates
On the left of Figure 5 we see a tree-like cirquent obtained from the non-tree-like cirquent
on the right by duplicating and separating shared descendants in the same style as we
obtained the left cirquent of Figure 1 from the right cirquent. The two cirquents of Figure
5, however, are not extensionally identical — after all, every legal run of the right cirquent
contains at most one move while legal runs of the left cirquent may contain two moves. The
two cirquents are different in a much stronger sense than extensional non-identity though.
A machine that selects the left outgoing edge of the left ⊔-gate and the right outgoing edge
of the right ⊔-gate wins the game represented by the left cirquent of Figure 5 under any
interpretation, so that the cirquent is strongly valid. On the other hand, the right cirquent
of Figure 5 is obviously not strongly valid. Morally, the difference between the two cirquents
is that, in the right cirquent, unlike the left cirquent, the subcirquent (“resource”) p ⊔ q is
shared between the two ∧-conjuncted parents. Sharing means that only one resolution can
be made in the ⊔-gate — a resolution that “works well” for both parents. There is no such
resolution though, because the two parents “want” two different choices of a ⊔-disjunct.
In contrast, in the left cirquent, both of these conflicting “desires” can be satisfied as each
parent has its own ⊔-child, so that there is no need to coordinate resolutions.
In layman’s terms, a shared resource (subcirquent) can be explained using the following
metaphor. Imagine Victor and his wife Peggy own a joint bank account, with a balance of $
20,000, reserved for family needs. This resource can be seen as a shared choice combination
of truck, furniture, and anything of family use that $20,000 can buy.10 However, if Victor
prefers a truck while Peggy prefers furniture (and both cost $20,000), then they will have
to sit down and decide together whether furniture is more important for the family or a
truck, as their budget does not allow to get both. The situation would be very different
if both Victor and Peggy had their own accounts, each worth $20,000. After all, the total
balance in this case would be $40,000 rather than $20,000.
As we saw, the right cirquent of Figure 5 cannot be adequately translated into a formula
using the standard way of turning non-trees into trees. However, using some non-standard
and creative ways, a formula which is extensionally identical to that cirquent can still be
found. For instance, one can easily see that (p ⊔ q) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬q) is such a formula (as long
as its ⊔-gate is given the same ID as the ID of the original cirquent’s ⊔-gate, of course).
Well, we just got lucky in this particular case. “Luck” would not have been on our side if
the cirquent under question was slightly more evolved, such as the one of Figure 6.
10If Victor and Peggy may change their mind several times, and the sellers’ return policies are flexible
enough, then this is a toggling combination rather than a choice one.
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Figure 6: A more evolved example of sharing
5. Clustering selectional gates
We now further generalize cirquents by adding an extra parameter to them, called cluster-
ing (for selectional gates). The latter is nothing but a partition of the set of all selectional
gates into subsets, called clusters, satisfying the condition that all gates within any given
cluster have the same label (all are ⊔-gates, or all are ∧ -gates, or . . . ) and the same out-
degree. Due to this condition, we can talk about the outdegree of a cluster meaning the
common outdegree of its elements, or the type of a cluster meaning the common type (la-
bel) of its elements. An additional condition that we require to be satisfied by all cirquents
is that the question on whether any two given selectional gates are in the same cluster be
decidable.
Just like nodes do, each cluster also has its own ID. For clarity, we assume that the ID
of a cluster is the same as the smallest of the IDs of the elements of the cluster. The extended
ID of a selectional gate is the expression nk, where n is the ID of the gate and the subscript k
is the ID of the cluster to which the gate belongs. When representing cirquents graphically,
one could require to show the extended ID of each selectional gate and (just) the ID of any
other node. More often, however, we draw cirquents in a lazy yet unambiguous way, where
only cluster IDs are indicated; furthermore, such IDs can be (though not always will be)
omitted for singleton clusters. Figure 7 shows the same cirquent, on the left represented
fully and on the right represented in a lazy way, with the identical cluster ID “7” attached
to two ⊔-gates indicating that they are in the same cluster, while the absence of a cluster
ID for the middle ⊔-gate indicating that it is in a different, singleton cluster (and so would
be any other selectional gate if drawn without a cluster ID). Thus, altogether there are two
clusters here, one — cluster 8 — containing gate 8, and the other — cluster 7 containing
gates 7 and 9.
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Figure 7: A cirquent with clustered selectional gates
It may be helpful for one’s intuition to think of each cluster as a single gate-style physical
device rather than a collection of individual gates. Namely, a cluster consisting of n gates
of outdegree m, as a single device, would have n outputs and m n-tuples of inputs. Figure
8 depicts this new kind of a “gate” for the case when n = 3, m = 2 and the type of the
cluster is ⊔.
❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄ ❄
⊔
a0 b0 c0
a1 b1 c1 a2 b2 c2
inputs inputs
❄ ❄ ❄
outputs
t t t
t t t t t t
Figure 8: Clusters as generalized gates
The device shown in Figure 8 should be thought of as a switch that can be set to one of the
positions 1 or 2 (otherwise no signals will pass through it). Setting it to 1 simultaneously
connects the three input lines a1, b1 and c1 to the output lines a0, b0 and c0, respectively
(the three lines are parallel, isolated from each other, so that no signal can jump from one
line to another). Similarly, setting the switch to 2 connects a2, b2 and c2 to a0, b0 and c0,
respectively. This is thus an “either (a1, b1, c1) or (a2, b2, c2)” kind of a switch; combinations
such as, say, (a1, b2, c1), are not available.
Figure 9 shows the cirquent of Figure 7 with its clusters re-drawn in the style of Figure
8.
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Figure 9: An alternative representation of the cirquent of Figure 7
Representing clusters in the way we have just done illustrates that they are nothing but
generalized gates. In fact, this is a very natural generalization. Namely, a gate in the
ordinary sense is the special case of this general sort of a gate where the number of output
lines (as well as input lines in each group of inputs) equals 1. Technically, however, we
prefer to continue seeing clusters as sets of ordinary gates as they were officially defined at
the beginning of this section. So, drawings in the style of Figures 8 or 9 will never reemerge
in this paper, and whatever was said about clusters as individual “gates” of a new type can
be safely forgotten.
Cirquents of the previous section should be viewed as special cases of cirquents in the
new sense of this section. Namely, they are the cases where each selectional gate forms its
own, single-element cluster. With this view, the semantical concepts that we reintroduce
in this section conservatively generalize those of the previous section.
The definition of a legal run of the game represented by a cirquent C is the same as
before (Definition 4.1), with the difference that now moves are made within clusters rather
than individual gates. That is, each move of a legal run of C looks like c.i, where c is the ID
of a cluster (rather than of a gate), and i is a positive integer not exceeding the outdegree
of that cluster. The intuitive meaning of such a move c.i is selecting the ith outgoing edge
(together with the corresponding child) simultaneously in each gate belonging to cluster c.
All other conditions on the legality of runs remain literally the same as before. Anyway, let
us not be lazy to fully (re)produce such a definition:
Definition 5.1. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, and Φ a position. Φ is a legal
position of the game C∗ iff, with a “cluster” below meaning a cluster of C, the following
conditions are satisfied:
(1) Each labmove of Φ has one of the following forms:
(a) ⊤c.i, where c is a ∨-, ▽- or ⊔-cluster and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of c;
(b) ⊥c.i, where c is a ∧-, △- or ⊓-cluster and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of c.
(2) Whenever c is a choice cluster, Φ contains at most one occurrence of a labmove of the
form ℘c.i.
(3) Whenever c is a sequential cluster and Φ is of the form 〈. . . , ℘c.i, . . . , ℘c.j, . . .〉, we have
i < j.
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So, for instance, 〈⊤8.1,⊤7.2〉 is a legal run of the cirquent of Figure 7, but 〈⊤8.1,⊤9.2〉
is not, because 9 is (a gate ID but) not a cluster ID. To summarize once again, selections
(moves) in individual gates are no longer available. Rather, they should be made in clusters.
Definition 5.2. In the context of a given cirquent C and a legal run Γ of C, we will say
that a selectional gate g of a cluster c is unresolved iff either no moves of the form c.j have
been made in Γ, or infinitely many such moves have been made. Otherwise g is resolved
and, where c.i is the last move of the form c.j made in Γ, the child pointed at by the ith
outgoing edge of g is said to be the resolvent of g.
With the terms “unresolved”, “resolved” and “resolvent” conservatively redefined this
way, the definition of truth for a cirquent and its nodes is literally the same11 in our present
case as in the case of the cirquents of the previous section (Definition 4.3), so we do not
reproduce it here. The same applies to the definition of the Wn components of the games
represented by cirquents (Definition 4.4).
Let us look at the game represented by the cirquents of Figure 7 once again. The
meaning of the move “7.2” in this game is selecting outgoing edge #2 in both gates of
cluster 7. Intuitively, the effect of such a move is connecting gate 10 directly to node 2 and
gate 11 directly to node 6. Thus, the move “7.2” can be seen as a choice (choice #2) shared
between gates 10 and 11; that shared choice, however, yields different, unshared results for
the two gates: result 2 for gate 10 while result 6 for gate 11. This sort of sharing is very
different from the sort of sharing represented by gate 8: the effect of the move “8.1” is
sharing both the choice #1 as well as the result 3 of that choice.
Back to the world of Victor and Peggy, imagine they are in their family car on a road
between two cities A and B. Victor likes sports but never goes to theaters. Peggy likes
theaters but never attends games. There is a basketball game and a ballet show tonight in
city A. And there is a football game and an opera show in city B. The shared choice/move
in this situation is a choice between “drive to A” and “drive to B” (they only have one car!).
The outcomes of either choice, however, are not shared. For instance, the outcome of the
choice “drive to A” is “see the basketball match” for Victor while “see the ballet” for Peggy.
Victor and Peggy can negotiate and decide between the two pairs (Basketball,Ballet) or
(Football,Opera). But the pairs (Basketball,Opera) and (Football,Ballet) are not available.
As for the stronger type of sharing corresponding to the middle ⊔-gate of Figure 7, it
can be explained by the following modification of the situation: Both Victor and Peggy are
fond of Impressionism. There is a Monet exhibition in city A, and a Pissarro exhibition in
city B. The action/choice — driving to A or driving to B — is again shared. But now so
is the corresponding outcome “see Monet’s paintings” or “see Pissarro’s paintings”.
While we could continue elaborating on independent philosophical and mathemati-
cal/technical motivations for introducing clustering, here we just want to point out the very
direct connections of our approach to the already well motivated IF (independence-friendly)
logic. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of the latter, or else he or she
may take a quick look at the concise yet complete (for our purposes) overview of the subject
given in [35]. It should be noted that we use the term “IF logic” in a generic sense, making
no terminological distinction between Hintikka and Sandu’s [6] original version of IF logic
and Hodges’s [7] generalization of it termed in [8] slash logic. In fact, when talking about
the (“traditional”) syntax or semantics of IF logic, what we have in mind are those of slash
11Unlike Definition 5.1 which, at least, changed the word “gate” to the word “cluster” when reproducing
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logic. It is assumed that all formulas of IF logic are written in negation normal form, and
that different occurrences of quantifiers in them always bind different variables. As pointed
out in Section 3.3 of [35], “in the literature the interest almost always pertains to the truth
of a sentence” (as opposed to falsity which, in IF logic, is not the same as “not true”). And
it is known that slashing universal quantifiers or conjunctions has no effect on the truth
(as opposed to falsity) status of formulas. Hence, in this section, we further assume that
only existential quantifiers and disjunctions are slashed in the formulas of IF logic. Finally,
without much (if any) loss of generality, we assume that the semantics of IF logic exclusively
deals with models with countable domains; namely, such a domain is always {1, 2, 3, . . .} or
some nonempty finite initial portion of it.
Computability logic insists on algorithmicity of ⊤’s strategies, while IF logic, in its
game semantics, allows any strategies. Let us, for now, consider the version of IF logic
which differs from its canonical version only in that it, like CoL, requires ⊤’s (which there
is usually called ∃-Player, or Verifier, or Eloise) strategies to be effective, while imposing
no restrictions on ⊥’s (∀-Player’s, Falsifier’s, Abelard’s) strategies. Call this version of IF
logic effective IF logic.
Remember that the outgoing edges of each node of a cirquent come in a fixed left-to-
right order: edge #1, edge #2, edge #3, etc. Let us call these numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. the
order numbers of the corresponding edges.
We now claim that the fragment of our cirquent logic where cirquents are allowed to
have only two — ∧ and ⊔ — sorts of gates is sufficient to cover effective IF logic, and far
beyond. A verification of this claim — perhaps at the philosophical rather than technical
level — is left to the reader.
Namely, each formula E of effective IF logic can be understood as the cirquent obtained
from it through performing the following operations:
Description 5.3.
(1) Ignoring slashes, write E in the form of a tree-like cirquent, understanding ∀ as a
“long” ∧-conjunction and ∃ as a “long” ∨-disjunction. This way, each occurrence O
of a quantifier, conjunction or disjunction gives rise to one (if O is not in the scope
of a quantifier) or many (if O is in the scope of a quantifier) gates. We say that each
such gate, as well as each outgoing edge of it, originates from O. Also, since we
assume that different occurrences of quantifiers in IF formulas always bind different
variables, instead of saying “. . . originates from the occurrence of ∀y (or ∃y)” we can
unambiguously simply say “. . . originates from y”.
(2) Change the label of each ∨-gate to ⊔.
(3) Cluster the disjunctive gates so that, any two such gates a and b belong to the same
cluster if and only if they originate from the same occurrence of ∃x/y1, . . . , yn or
∨/y1, . . . , yn in E, and the following condition is satisfied:
• Let ea1, . . . , e
a
k and e
b
1, . . . , e
b
k be the paths (sequences of edges) from the root of the
tree to a and b, respectively. Then, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the order numbers of the
edges eai and e
b
i are identical unless these edges originate from one of the variables
y1, . . . , yn.
Let us see an example to visualize how our construction works. A traditional starting point
of introductory or survey papers on IF logic is the formula
∀x∃y∀z∃t/x,y p(x, y, z, t). (5.1)
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Technically, its meaning can be expressed by the second-order formula
∃f∃g∀x∀z p
(
x, f(x), z, g(z)
)
12
or the following formula with Henkin’s branching quantifiers:
∀x∃y
∀z∃t
p(x, y, z, t),
with the shape of the quantifier array indicating that the two quantifier blocks ∀x∃y
and ∀z∃t are independent of each other even though, in (5.1), one occurs in the scope
of the other. We agreed earlier to write ∧,∨ instead of ∀ ,∃ . So, we rewrite (5.1) as
∧x∨y∧z∨t/x,y p(x, y, z, t). This formula, however, is not yet adequate. The philosophy
of IF logic associates the intuitions of finding (rather than just existence) with existential
quantifiers or disjunctions; and, as we know, it is the operator/gate ⊔ whose precise mean-
ing is actually finding things (rather than ∨, which is merely about existence of things). So,
∨ should be replaced with ⊔ , and we get the formula ∧x⊔y∧z⊔t/x,y p(x, y, z, t) which,
ignoring the slash for now, can be seen as a tree-like cirquent in the sense of the previous
section. It now remains to account for the slash by adequately clustering the cirquent.
Namely, the clustering should make sure that, whenever a and b are two upper-level (those
originating from t) ⊔-gates such that the paths from the root to them — seen not as se-
quences of edges but as sequences of the corresponding order numbers — only differ in their
first two elements (the ones originating from x and y, of which t should be independent), a
and b are in the same cluster. Figure 10 illustrates this arrangement. For compactness con-
siderations, in this figure we have assumed that the universe of discourse (the set over which
x, y, z, t range) is just {1, 2}; also, we have written p1111, p1112, etc. instead of p(1, 1, 1, 1),
p(1, 1, 1, 2), etc.
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Figure 10: Mimicking ∀x∃y∀z∃t/x,y p(x, y, z, t) (when the universe is {1, 2})
To feel the difference created by clustering, let us consider the interpretation that sends
the four atoms p1111, p1122, p2212, p2221 to ⊤ and sends all other atoms to ⊥. Then the
game represented by the cirquent of Figure 10 cannot be won (by ⊤). On the other hand,
it would be winnable if there was no clustering. Further, it is also winnable if clustering
is made finer (yet not trivial) as done in the cirquent of Figure 11. The latter expresses
the “slightly” modified form ∀x∃y∀z∃t/x p(x, y, z, t) of (5.1), and is won by an HPM that
12As long as we deal with effective IF logic, one should require here that f and g range over recursive
functions.
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generates the run
〈⊤1.1, ⊤3.1, ⊤4.2, ⊤2.2, ⊤5.2, ⊤6.1〉
(or any permutation of the above). Note that the same run is simply not a legal run of the
cirquent of Figure 10.
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Figure 11: Mimicking ∀x∃y∀z∃t/x p(x, y, z, t) (when the universe is {1, 2})
While (∧,⊔)-cirquents allow us to fully capture effective IF logic, they, at the same time,
are significantly more expressive than the latter is, even if — or, especially if — we limit
ourselves to finite cirquents, and correspondingly limit IF formulas to propositional ones.
As mentioned earlier, IF logic has no smooth approach at the purely propositional level,
and is forced to severely limit the forms of (meaningful) propositional-level formulas as,
for instance, done in [33]. In particular, it encounters serious difficulties in allowing inde-
pendence from conjunctions or disjunctions (rather than quantifiers). These problems are
automatically neutralized under our approach. We do not introduce any restrictions what-
soever on the forms of cirquents or allowable clusterings in them; yet, all such expressions
are semantically meaningful.
Of course, a penalty for the higher expressive power of cirquents is the awkwardness
associated with the necessity to draw graphs instead of writing formulas. But, again,
various syntactic shortcuts can be introduced to make life easier, with recurrence operators,
quantifiers or the slash notation being among such shortcuts. It should also be remembered
that drawing cirquents may be some annoyance for humans (when writing papers) but
not for computers (when using logic in their work); the latter, in fact, would much prefer
cirquents, as they are exponentially more efficient means of expression than formulas are.
In any case, a more significant achievement than expressiveness is probably avoiding the
necessity to deal with the unplayable and troublemaking imperfect-information games on
which the traditional semantics for IF logic are based. We owe this effect to the fact that
clustering enforces at the game level what IF logic calls uniformity and tries to enforce at
the strategy level. Rather than relying on players’ integrity in expecting that they — to
their disadvantage — will conscientiously forget the moves they have already seen but of
which their actions should be independent, clustering simply makes “cheating” physically
impossible. Perhaps this point is important enough to be repeated in an empasised form:
While IF logic traditionally accounts for independence on the level of strate-
gies (by imposing uniformity conditions on them), our approach does so
directly on the level of game rules: independence is enforced through making
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“dependent” moves simply impossible to make — such moves are “physi-
cally” unavailable.
But it should be remembered that “effective IF logic”, while both mathematically and
philosophically reasonable, is not at all the same as IF logic in its canonical form.13 So,
a true merger between CoL and IF logic would seemingly require a compromise from one
of them: either IF logic should adopt the requirement of effectiveness of strategies, or
computability logic should drop this (central to its philosophy) requirement. Probably
neither camp would be willing to make a compromise.
Fortunately, there is no real need for any compromises. The following section further
generalizes the concept of cirquents in a conservative way. The new cirquents, unlike the
cirquents of the present section, are powerful enough to express anything that the traditional
(“non-effective”) IF logic can. This is achieved through extending the idea of clustering from
selectional gates to ∨-gates, yet without associating any moves with such gates or clusters.
6. Clustering ∨-gates
A cirquent in the sense of the present section is the same as one in the sense of the previous
section, with the difference that now not only the set of selectional gates is partitioned into
clusters, but also the set of ∨-gates (but not the set of ∧-gates — not yet, at least). The
condition on clustering is the same as before: all gates within a given cluster are required
to have the same type (label) and same outdegree. Cirquents in the sense of the previous
section are seen as special cases of cirquents in the present sense, namely, the cases where
all ∨-clusters are singletons.
The legal positions of the game represented by a cirquent in this new sense are defined
in literally the same way as before (Definition 5.1). So, clustering ∨-gates in a cirquent does
not affect the set of its legal runs.
By a metaselection for a cirquent C we will mean a (not necessarily effective) partial
function f from ∨-clusters of C to the set of positive integers, such that, for any ∨-cluster
c, whenever defined, f(c) does not exceed the outdegree of c.14
In the context of a given cirquent C, a legal run Γ of C and a metaselection f for
C, we will say that a ∨-gate g of a cluster c is unresolved iff f is undefined at c (note
that a childless ∨-gate will always be unresolved). Otherwise g is resolved, and the child
13The idea of what we here call “effective IF logic” can be clearly found in [5], where Hintikka argued that
restricting ∃’s (⊤’s) strategies to effective ones could be a formulation of constructivism in the philosophy of
mathematics. To the present author’s best knowledge, however, no subsequent technical attempts have been
made to correspondingly reconstruct the semantics of IF logic. The general idea of basing game semantics on
effective strategies and this way realizing the philosophy of constructivism can be found in the even earlier
work [9] by the present author (this paper was later refined and published in the form of [10]). [9, 10] also
made the first, “experimental” steps towards technically realizing this line of thought. As for CoL, it takes
pride not in putting forward the idea of considering effective strategies (which is so natural that it could
hardly have escaped the thoughts of anyone working on game semantics), but in making it actually work and
generate non-trivial logics. In contrast, restricting strategies to effective ones within Hintikka’s framework
leaves us with an essentially empty logic: there are no valid (as opposed to true) formulas there other than
trivialities such as ⊤ or p(x) → ⊤ (but not p(x) → p(x): this principle, i.e. ¬p(x) ∨ p(x), fails when p(x)
is undecidable). This is probably one of the reasons why the IF-logic community has remained focused on
not-necessarily-effective strategies.
14An equivalent approach would be letting f be a total function from the set of ∨-clusters to the set
{0, 1, 2, 3, . . .} of natural numbers (rather than positive integers); then, instead of saying that f is undefined
at c, we could simply say that f(c) = 0.
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of it pointed at by the f(c)th outgoing edge is said to be the resolvent of g. As for the
same-name concepts “unresolved”, “resolved” and “resolvent” for selectional gates, they
are defined literally as before (Definition 5.2). Note that these three concepts depend on
f but not Γ when g is a ∨-gate, while they depend on Γ but not f when g is a selectional
gate. The function f thus acts as a “metaextension” of Γ. Intuitively, it can be thought of
as selections in ∨-clusters made by the guardian angel of ⊤ in favor of ⊤ after the actual
play took place (rather than during it), even if the latter lasted infinitely long; unlike ⊤, its
guardian angel has magic — nonalgorithmic — intellectual powers to make best possible
selections. Technically, however, selections by the “angel”, unlike selections made by either
player, are not moves of the game.
The following definition refines the earlier definitions of truth by relativizing this concept
— renamed into metatruth — with respect to a metaselection as an additional parameter.
Definition 6.1. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, Γ a legal run of C, and f a
metaselection for C. In this context, with “metatrue” to be read as “metatrue w.r.t.
(∗,Γ, f)”, we say that:
• An L-port is metatrue iff L∗ = ⊤.
• A resolved selectional gate is metatrue iff so is its resolvent.
• No unresolved disjunctive selectional gate is metatrue.
• Each unresolved conjunctive selectional gate is metatrue.
• A ∨-gate is metatrue iff it is resolved and its resolvent is metatrue.
• A ∧-gate is metatrue iff so are all of its children.
Finally, we say that C is metatrue iff so is its root.
The following definition brings us from metatruth back to truth.
Definition 6.2. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, and Γ a legal run of C. We say
that C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ) iff there is a metaselection f for C such that C is metatrue
w.r.t. (∗,Γ, f).
It is left to the reader to see why the new concept of truth is a conservative generalization
of its earlier counterparts. The same applies to the following definition, which completes our
definition of the game C∗ represented by any given cirquent C under any given interpretation
∗.
Definition 6.3. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, and Γ a legal run of C. Then Γ
is a ⊤-won run of the game C∗ iff C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ).
We now claim that any formula E of (this time ordinary, “non-effective”) IF logic can
be adequately written as a tree-like cirquent C with only ∨ and ∧ gates; namely, such a
cirquent C is obtained from E through applying the steps 1 and 3 of Description 5.3, with
step 2 omitted. For any interpretation ∗, we will then have C∗ = ⊤ iff E is true (under the
same interpretation of atoms) in IF logic. Figure 12 shows an example. As an easy exercise,
the reader may want to verify that the cirquent of that figure is ⊥ under the interpretation
which sends p1111, p1122, p2212, p2221 to ⊤ and sends all other atoms to ⊥. Note that this
cirquent represents an elementary game, unlike its counterpart from Figure 10.
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Figure 12: Representing ∀x∃y∀z∃t/x,y p(x, y, z, t) (when the universe is {1, 2})
Just as for any other claims made in this paper regarding connections to IF logic, we are not
attempting to provide a proof of our present claim. Such a proof would require reproducing
and analyzing one of the semantics accepted/recognized in the IF-logic community, which
could take us too far — the present paper is on computability logic rather than IF logic
after all and, even if a known semantics of IF logic and the corresponding fragment of the
semantics of CoL turned out to be not exactly equivalent, a question would arise about
which one is a more adequate materialization of the original philosophy of IF logic.
7. Clustering all gates; ranking
Other than the claimed fact that the cirquents of the previous section achieve the full
expressive power of IF logic, there are no good reasons to stop at those cirquents. Indeed,
if we clustered selectional and ∨-gates, why not do the same with the remaining ∧ type of
gates? Naturally, the semantics of clustered ∧ gates would have to be symmetric to that
of clustered ∨-gates. Namely, a universally quantified metaselection h should be associated
with them, as we associated an existentially quantified metaselection f with ∨-clusters in
the previous section. Such an h can be thought of as a guardian angel of ⊥ that makes
selections in ∧-clusters in favor of ⊥ after the game has been played by the two players.
One can show that then, no matter how the ∧-gates are clustered, truth in the sense of the
previous section is equivalent to an assertion that sounds like the right side of Definition 6.2
but starts with the words “there is an f such that, for all h,. . . ” instead of just “there is an
f such that. . . ”. But then the question comes: why this quantification order and not “for
all h there is an f such that. . . ”, which would obviously yield a different yet meaningful
concept of truth?15 Again, there is no good answer, and here we see the need for a yet
more general approach that would be flexible enough to handle the semantical concepts
induced by either quantification order. This brings us to the idea of introducing one more
parameter into cirquents, which we call ranking. The latter is an indication of in what order
selections by the “guardian angels” should be made. Furthermore, we allow not just one
but several “guardian angels” for either player, with each “angel” responsible for a certain
subset of clusters rather than all clusters of a given type. Then, again, ranking fixes the
order in which these multiple “angels” should make their selections. Let us get down to
formal definitions to make these intuitions precise and more clear.
15This predicate of truth, in contrast to the previous one, would depend on how ∧-gates are clustered
but not on how ∨-gates are clustered.
FROM FORMULAS TO CIRQUENTS IN COMPUTABILITY LOGIC 29
A cirquent in the sense of the present section is the same as one in the sense of the
previous section, with the following two changes. Firstly, now the set of all gates (including
∧-gates) is partitioned into clusters, with each cluster, as before, satisfying the condition
that all gates in it have the same type and the same outdegree. Secondly, there is an
additional parameter called ranking. The latter is a partition of the set of all parallel (∨
and ∧) clusters into a finite number of subsets, called ranks, arranged in a linear order,
with each rank satisfying the condition that all clusters in it have the same type (but not
necessarily the same outdegree). A rank containing ∧-clusters is said to be conjunctive,
and a rank containing ∨-clusters disjunctive. Since the ranks are linearly ordered, we can
refer to them as the 1st rank, the 2nd rank, etc. or rank 1, rank 2, etc. Also, instead of
“cluster c is in the ith rank”, we may say “c is of (or has) rank i”.
Cirquents in the sense of the previous section are understood as special cases of cirquents
in the present sense, namely, as cirquents where all ∧-clusters are singletons of the highest
rank, and all ∨-clusters (which are not necessarily singletons) are of the lowest rank. Here
we say “highest rank” and “lowest rank” instead of “rank 2” and “rank 1” just for safety,
because, if one of the two types of parallel gates is absent, then rank 1 would be both highest
and lowest; and, if there are no parallel gates at all, the cirquent would not even have rank
1.
Let C be a cirquent with k ranks, and let 1 ≤ i ≤ k. An i-metaselection for C is
a (not necessarily effective) partial function from the ith rank of C to the set of positive
integers, satisfying the condition that, for any given cluster c of the ith rank, whenever fi(c)
is defined, its value does not exceed the outdegree of c. And a (simply) metaselection for
C is a k-tuple (f1, . . . , fk) where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, fi is an i-metaselection for C.
Clustering parallel gates and ranking has no effect on the set of legal runs of the
game represented by a cirquent, so the definition of legal positions for cirquents of Section
5 (Definition 5.1) transfers to the present case without any changes.
Definition 7.1. In the context of a given cirquent C with k ranks, a legal run Γ of C and a
metaselection ~f = (f1, . . . , fk) for C, we will say that a ∨-gate g of a cluster c is unresolved
iff, where i is the rank of c, the function fi is undefined at c. Otherwise g is resolved, and
the child of it pointed at by the fi(c)th outgoing edge is said to be the resolvent of g. As
for the same-name concepts “unresolved”, “resolved” and “resolvent” for selectional gates,
they are defined literally as before (Definition 5.2).
The following definition of metatruth can be seen to conservatively generalize its pre-
decessor, Definition 6.1:
Definition 7.2. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, Γ a legal run of C, and ~f a
metaselection for C. In this context, with “metatrue” to be read as “metatrue w.r.t.
(∗,Γ, ~f)”, we say that:
• An L-port is metatrue iff L∗ = ⊤.
• A resolved gate (of any of the eight types) is metatrue iff so is its resolvent.
• No unresolved disjunctive gate (of any of the four types) is metatrue.
• Every unresolved conjunctive gate (of any of the four types) is metatrue.
Finally, we say that C is metatrue iff so is its root.
The following definition brings us from metatruth back to truth. Again, it can be seen
to conservatively generalize its predecessor, Definition 6.2:
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Definition 7.3. Let C be a cirquent with k ranks, ∗ an interpretation, and Γ a legal run
of C. We say that C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ) iff
Q1f1 . . .Qkfk such that C is metatrue w.r.t. (
∗,Γ, (f1, . . . , fk)).
Here each Qifi abbreviates the phrase “for every i-metaselection fi for C” if the ith rank
is conjunctive, and “there is an i-metaselection fi for C” if the ith rank is disjunctive.
With truth redefined this way, the (remaining) Wn component of the game C∗ repre-
sented by a cirquent C under an interpretation ∗ is defined as before. Namely, a legal run
Γ of C∗ is considered ⊤-won iff C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ).
To understand what we have achieved by introducing ranking and why such a gener-
alization of cirquents was naturally called for, let us, for simplicity, limit our attention to
selectional-gate-free cirquents. This fragment of our logic can be seen to be sufficient to
capture and naturally generalize the conservative extension of IF logic known as extended
IF logic (cf. [35]). The latter, in addition to what IF logic calls strong negation ∼, also con-
siders weak negation ¬. While ∼E simply means the result of changing in E each operator
and atom to its dual (p to ¬p and vice versa, ∀ to ∃ and vice versa, ∧ to ∨ and vice versa)
and hence there is no real need to have ∼ as a primitive, weak negation ¬ in (extended) IF
logic is quite problematic. Namely, the latter does not act like an ordinary operator that
can be applied anywhere in a formula; rather, extended IF logic (essentially) only allows ¬
to be applied to entire IF formulas, thus deeming meaningless and illegal expressions such
as, say, ∃u¬∀x∃y∀z∃t/x p(x, y, z, t, u). This is so because the traditional approaches to
IF logic are not general enough to directly provide a semantics for ¬. This odd situation
makes it evident that more general approaches are necessary. Our approach can claim to
be one that fits the bill.16
As noted earlier, the reader is expected to be familiar with the basic concepts and ideas
of IF logic and, specifically, the two concepts of negation that we are discussing. So, we
only explain the present point through particular examples.
Our earlier assumption was that only existential quantifiers and disjunctions were
slashed in formulas of non-extended IF logic, as slashing universal quantifiers or conjunc-
tions had no effect on the truth conditions of formulas there. The same is no longer the case
if one deals with negations though. Accordingly, from now on, we depart from the above
assumption and allow slashing any operators in what we consider to be legitimate formulas
of IF logic.
Earlier we saw how to translate an IF formula E into an equivalent cirquent. Now
we conservatively refine that translation method in a way that accounts for the possibility
that E contains slashed conjunctions and/or universal quantifiers. Namely, E should be
understood as the cirquent E◦ defined below:
Description 7.4. Let E be any formula of (non-extended) IF logic. We define E◦ as the
cirquent obtained from E through performing the following steps:
(1) Ignoring slashes, write E in the form of a tree-like cirquent, understanding ∀ as a
“long” ∧-conjunction and ∃ as a “long” ∨-disjunction. This way, each occurrence O
of a quantifier, conjunction or disjunction gives rise to one (if O is not in the scope
of a quantifier) or many (if O is in the scope of a quantifier) gates. We say that each
16It should be noted that there are other approaches closely related to or extending IF logic — namely,
Hodges’s [7] trump semantics and Va¨a¨na¨nen’s [38] team logic — in which one can form the weak negation of
any formula. Those approaches are however quite different from ours, and we will not attempt a comparison.
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such gate, as well as each outgoing edge of it, originates from O. Also, since we
assume that different occurrences of quantifiers in IF formulas always bind different
variables, instead of saying “. . . originates from the occurrence of ∀y (or ∃y)” we can
unambiguously simply say “. . . originates from y”.
(2) Cluster the gates so that, any two gates a and b belong to the same cluster if and only if
they originate from the same occurrence of ∃x/y1, . . . , yn, ∨/y1, . . . , yn, ∀x/y1, . . . , yn
or ∧/y1, . . . , yn in E, and the following condition is satisfied:
• Let ea1, . . . , e
a
k and e
b
1, . . . , e
b
k be the paths (sequences of edges) from the root of the
tree to a and b, respectively. Then, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the order numbers of the
edges eai and e
b
i are identical unless these edges originate from one of the variables
y1, . . . , yn.
(3) Impose ranking on the resulting cirquent, putting all ∨-clusters into the lowest rank
and all ∧-clusters into the highest rank.
We claim that such a translation of IF formulas E to cirquents E◦ is adequate. That is,
for any interpretation/model ∗, E is true in ∗ in the sense of IF logic if and only if (E◦)∗ = ⊤
in our sense.
We further claim that any formula ¬E of extended IF logic adequately translates into
the cirquent (¬E)◦ defined below:
Description 7.5. Let E be any formula of (non-extended) IF logic. We define (¬E)◦ as
the cirquent obtained from E through performing the following steps:
(1) Turn E into E◦ according to Description 7.4.
(2) Change in E◦ every port label (literal) p to ¬p and vice versa, and also change every
gate label ∨ to ∧ and vice versa.
Finally, we claim that any formula ∼E of IF logic adequately translates into the cirquent
(∼E)◦ defined below:
Description 7.6. Let E be any formula of (non-extended) IF logic. We define (∼E)◦ as
the cirquent obtained from E through performing the following steps:
(1) Turn E into (¬E)◦ according to Description 7.5.
(2) Swap the ranks in the resulting cirquent. That is, make all elements of the formerly
lowest rank now belong to the highest rank, and vice versa.
Figures 13, 14 and 15 illustrate applications of our translations to the IF-logic formula
∀x∃y∀z/x,y∃t/x,y p(x, y, z, t)
and two forms of its negation. As before, the universe of discourse here is assumed to be
{1, 2}. For compactness considerations, we have written p1111, p1112, etc. instead of ¬p1111,
¬p1112, etc. To each gate in those figures we have attached an expression of the form n
m.
It should be understood as an indication that the gate belongs to cluster n, and that such
a cluster n is of rank m.
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Figure 13: ∀x∃y∀z/x,y∃t/x,y p(x, y, z, t) (when the universe is {1, 2})
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Figure 14: ¬∀x∃y∀z/x,y∃t/x,y p(x, y, z, t) (when the universe is {1, 2})
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Figure 15: ∼∀x∃y∀z/x,y∃t/x,y p(x, y, z, t) (when the universe is {1, 2})
The above cirquents are pairwise extensionally non-identical. An interpretation separating
the cirquent of Figure 13 from those of Figures 14 and 15 is one that sends all atoms to ⊤.
And an interpretation separating the cirquent of Figure 14 from the other two cirquents (by
making the former ⊤ while the latter ⊥) is the one that sends the four atoms p1111, p1221,
p2112, p2222 to ⊤ and sends all other atoms to ⊥.
The cirquent of Figure 13 can be seen to be extensionally identical to the cirquent of
figure 12. In general, the same would be the case for any pair of cirquents that syntactically
relate to each other in the same way as the cirquents of Figures 13 and 12 do, namely, where
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one cirquent is a cirquent with all ∨-clusters in the lowest rank and all ∧-clusters in the
highest rank, and the other cirquent is the result of ignoring in the first one all ∧-clusters
and ignoring ranking, after which it can be understood as a cirquent in the limited sense of
Section 6.
The cirquent of Figure 14 is the exact opposite of the cirquent of Figure 13, in the sense
that, under any interpretation ∗, one is ⊤ iff the other is ⊥. In general, if two cirquents C1
and C2 syntactically relate to each other as the cirquents of Figures 13 and 14 do, then,
for any interpretation ∗, we will have C∗2 = ¬C
∗
1 , where ¬ is computability logic’s ordinary
negation operation of Definition 2.2. As for the cirquent of Figure 15, it appears to be a
less natural modification of the cirquent of Figure 13 than the cirquent of Figure 14 is. In
particular, it is not clear why we, in the process of transforming the cirquent of figure 13
into the cirquent of Figure 15, not only changed the label of each node to its dual, but
also swapped the ranks. Furthermore, it would not be clear how to “swap” ranks if we had
more than two of them. So, in spite of IF logic’s tradition to see ∼ as the primary sort of
negation and treat the “ill-behaved” ¬ as a second-class citizen, we come to the vision that
it is ¬ rather than ∼ that is truly natural and deserves the first-class status.
Descriptions 7.4 and 7.5 only generate (selectional-gate-free) cirquents with two (in
normal cases) or fewer (in pathological cases) ranks, and hence these sorts of cirquents
are sufficient for capturing extended IF logic. Was there then a reasonable call for also
considering cirquents with greater numbers of ranks? After all, any approach in any area
of mathematics may find an infinite series of generalizations, and one should simply stop
somewhere. This is true but, in the process of generalizing, one should stop only at a natural
point where we have a more or less closed (in whatever sense) system. And stopping at
cirquents with ≤ 2 ranks (what extended IF logic essentially did) would not be such a
natural place. For, as noted earlier, the formalism of extended IF logic is not closed under
its logical operators, and we would be forced to deal with a similar sort of an artificial
restriction had we limited our considerations only to cirquents with ≤ 2 ranks.
To make the above point more clear, let us extend the syntax of IF logic by requiring
that all occurrences of quantifiers, conjunctions and disjunctions be superscripted with
positive integers, satisfying the following two conditions:
• Whenever 1 ≤ i < j and j is the superscript of some occurrence, so is i.
• Whenever i is the superscript of an occurrence of ∃ or ∨, the same i is not the superscript
of an occurrence of ∀ or ∧.
Such superscripts will be understood as indications of the ranks of the clusters originating
from the corresponding occurrences of operators when turning formulas into cirquents in
the style of Description 7.4. That is, clause 3 of Description 7.4 should now (for this new
syntax of IF logic) read as follows:
Impose ranking on the resulting cirquent, putting all clusters originating
from occurrences of i-superscripted operators17 into the ith rank, for any
superscript i occurring in E.
We baptize this newly extended version of IF logic as ranked IF logic. Let us call the
highest superscript appearing in a formula of ranked IF logic the ranking depth of that
formula.
Of course, extended IF logic is the fragment of ranked IF logic limited to formulas of
ranking depth ≤ 2. Namely, each non-negated formula E of IF logic translates into ranked
17That is, clusters whose gates originate from occurrences of i-superscripted operators.
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IF logic as the result F of adding the superscript 1 to each occurrence of ∃ and ∨, and
adding the superscript 2 to each occurrence of ∀ and ∧ — well, unless E contains no ∨ and
∃ , in which case the superscript 1 rather than 2 should be added to the occurrences of ∀
and ∧. Next, for any formula F of ranked IF logic (including the cases when F is obtained
from E as above), ¬F can be understood as an abbreviation for the result of changing in F
each occurrence of each literal p to ¬p and vice versa, each occurrence of ∧ to ∨ and vice
versa, and each occurrence of ∀ to ∃ and vice versa, without changing any superscripts in
this process.
With ¬ treated as just explained, in contrast with the situation in extended IF logic, ¬
can meaningfully occur anywhere in an expression of ranked IF logic. For instance, we can
write
∃u1¬∀1x∃2y∀1z∃2t/x p(x, y, z, t, u),
which will be simply understood as an abbreviation of
∃u1∃1x∀2y∃1z∀2t/x ¬p(x, y, z, t, u).
To get a further feel for the advantages of ranked IF logic over extended IF logic,
consider the formula ¬∃x∀y/x∼ p(x, y, z) of the latter which, in ranked IF logic, will be
written as ∀1x∃2y/x p(x, y, z). As we are dealing with a legal and hence semantically
meaningful expression of extended IF logic, we naturally want to be able to quantify it —
say, existentially — over z, and also be able to arbitrarily extend the original independences
— say, by making both quantifiers independent of ∃z and vice versa. Alas, extended IF
logic does not permit to apply quantification to a ¬-negated compound formula. But ranked
IF logic does. Namely, with a little analysis, the formula
∃1z∀2x/z∃3y/z,x p(x, y, z) (7.1)
can be seen to account for the intuitions that we wanted to capture by ∃z-quantifying the
formula and then making the new and old quantifiers independent of each other.
Figure 16 shows formula (7.1) as a cirquent, and Figure 17 shows two cirquents obtained
from it by putting both existential quantifiers into the same rank in an attempt to mechan-
ically turn (7.1) into an equivalent formula of ranking depth 2 (a formula of extended IF
logic). Either attempt fails. Namely, let † be the interpretation that sends the two atoms
p111, p122 to ⊤ and sends all other atoms to ⊥. Next, let
‡ be the interpretation that sends
the two atoms p111, p222 to ⊤ and sends all other atoms to ⊥. It can be seen that
(
∃1z∀2x/z∃3y/z,x p(x, y, z)
)†
= ⊤ whereas
(
∃1z∀2x/z∃1y/z,x p(x, y, z)
)†
= ⊥,
and
(
∃1z∀2x/z∃3y/z,x p(x, y, z)
)‡
= ⊥ whereas
(
∃2z∀1x/z∃2y/z,x p(x, y, z)
)‡
= ⊤.
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Figure 16: ∃1z∀2x/z∃3y/z,x p(x, y, z) (when the universe is {1, 2})
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Figure 17: ∃1z∀2x/z∃1y/z,x p(x, y, z) and ∃2z∀1x/z∃2y/z,x p(x, y, z)
As we just had a chance to observe, ranked IF logic provides greater syntactic flexibility
and convenience than extended IF logic does. This gives us reasons to expect that the
former is (not only a more direct and flexible means of expression but also) properly more
expressive than the latter, in the same sense as the latter is known to be more expressive
than ordinary, non-extended IF logic. A way to prove this conjecture can be expressing,
through a formula T of ranked IF logic, a definition of truth for formulas of ranked IF logic
of ranking depth ≤ 2 (such formulas fully cover extended IF logic). Now, if T itself was
expressible as a formula of ranking depth ≤ 2, then we would be able to produce a paradox
by writing a formula of ranking depth ≤ 2 that asserts its own not being true.
A related and more general question, which we leave unanswered, is about whether
various fragments of ranked IF logic, depending on the depth and order of ranking, yield
the expressive power of various hierarchical fragments of second-order logic. In expressive
power, ordinary IF logic is known to be equivalent to Σ11. One can naturally expect that
with higher ranks we can capture higher levels of the hierarchy. The same question can
as well be asked about ranked elementary cirquents (as opposed to formulas of ranked IF
logic) in general.
As any approach, our approach allows further generalizations. For instance, our present
linear orders on ranks can be relaxed to partial orders, which may give rise to an IF-logic-
style approach to independences between different . . . ranks. But enough is enough. Things
have already gone quite far, and further generalizations would be reasonable to make only
if and when a clear call for them comes. As pointed out, a call for the generalizations (of
both CoL and IF logic) we have made so far in this paper was the necessity to make the
formalisms reasonably complete, and neutralize certain unsettling, incompleteness-caused
phenomena such as the odd status of weak negation ¬ in IF logic, or the impossibility to
properly develop IF logic at the purely propositional level.
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However, in our step-by-step generalization process, stopping at cirquents of the present
section would not be right. There is one last necessary step remaining, which will be taken
in the following section.
8. General ports
Imagine a finite cirquent C in the sense of any of the previous sections. Let p1, . . . , pn be
the atoms, listed in their lexicographic order, used (positively or negatively) in the labels
of the ports of C. Then C is, in fact, an operation that takes an n-tuple of elementary
games (an interpretation, that is) and produces a new, not-necessarily elementary (unless
C only has ∨ and ∧ gates) game. The same is the case when C is infinite, only here, as
an operation, C may take an infinite sequence (rather than just an n-tuple) of elementary
games.
Cirquents thus are systematic ways to generate and express an infinite variety of op-
erations on games. However, as just noted, as long as we only consider cirquents in the
sense of the previous section(s), all such operations are limited to ones whose arguments
are elementary games ⊤ and ⊥. These are two very special and simple cases of games.
So, a natural call comes for generalizing our approach in a way that allows cirquents to
express operations with not only elementary arguments, but also with arguments that can
be arbitrary interactive computational problems (static games, that is) considered in CoL.
One way to achieve the above would be to change the concept of an interpretation ∗ so
that now it is allowed to send the atoms of a cirquent to any, not-necessarily-elementary,
static games. By doing so we would certainly gain a lot, but just as much would be lost: the
class of valid cirquents would shrink, victimizing many innocent ones such as, say, p→ p∧p
or p ∨ p → p ⊔ p. The point is that elementary problems (games) are meaningful and
interesting in their own right, and losing the ability to differentiate them from problems
in general would be too much of a sacrifice. For instance, classical logic, IF logic, or the
systems of computability-logic-based arithmetic constructed in [26, 29, 30], are exclusively
concerned with cases where atoms are interpreted as elementary problems.
We have a better solution. It is simply allowing two sorts of atoms in the language, one
for elementary problems and the other for all problems. This way, not only do we have the
ability to express combinations of problems of either sort within the same formal language,
but also combinations that intermix elementary problems with not-necessarily-elementary
ones.
Let us rename the objects to which we earlier refereed as (simply) “atoms” into elemen-
tary atoms. In addition to elementary atoms, we fix another infinite set of alphanumeric
strings, disjoint from the set of elementary atoms, and call its elements general atoms. We
shall continue using the lowercase p, q, r, s, p1, p(3, 4), . . . as metavariables for elementary
atoms, and we will be using the uppercase P , Q, R, S, P1, P (3, 4), . . . as metavariables for
general atoms. As before, a literal is L or ¬L, where L is an atom. In the former case the
literal is said to be positive, and in the latter case negative. Such a literal will be said to
be elementary or general depending on whether the atom L is elementary or general. The
two literals L and ¬L are said to be opposite. It is assumed that the question on whether
a literal is elementary or general is decidable.
A cirquent in the sense of the present section means the same as one in the sense of
the previous section, with the only difference that now not only elementary, but also general
literals are allowed as labels of ports. A port is said to be elementary or general, positive or
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negative depending on whether its label is so. Similarly, two ports are said to be opposite
iff their labels are so.
An interpretation now is a function ∗ that (as before) sends each elementary atom p to
an elementary game p∗, and sends each general atom P to any, not-necessarily-elementary,
static game P ∗. This function immediately extends to all literals by stipulating that, for
any (elementary or general) atom W , (¬W )∗ = ¬(W ∗), where ¬ in ¬(W ∗) is the ordinary
game negation operation of Definition 2.2.
For a run Γ and a string α, we will be using Γα to denote the result of deleting in Γ all
labmoves except those that look like ℘αβ (either player ℘ and whatever string β), and then
further deleting the prefix α in each remaining move — that is, replacing each ℘αβ by ℘β.
Our present definition of the legal runs of the game C∗ represented by a cirquent C
under an interpretation ∗ is similar to the earlier definition(s), with the difference that now
additional moves of the form a.α can be made, where a is (the ID of) a general port. The
intuitive meaning of such a move is making the move α in the copy of the game L∗ associated
with a, where L is the label of a. Accordingly, the additional condition that needs to be
satisfied for a legal run Γ is that, whenever a, L are as above, Γa. (intuitively the run of L∗
played in port a) should be a legal run of L∗. Below is a full definition:
Definition 8.1. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, and Φ a position. Φ is a legal
position of the game C∗ iff, with “cluster” and “port” below meaning those of C, the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Every labmove of Φ has one of the following forms:
(a) ⊤c.i, where c is a ∨-, ▽- or ⊔-cluster and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of c.
(b) ⊥c.i, where c is a ∧-, △- or ⊓-cluster and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of c.
(c) ℘a.β, where a is a general port, ℘ is either player, and β is some string.
(2) Whenever c is a choice cluster, Φ contains at most one occurrence of a labmove of the
form ℘c.i.
(3) Whenever c is a sequential cluster and Φ is of the form 〈. . . , ℘c.i, . . . , ℘c.j, . . .〉, we have
i < j.
(4) Whenever a is a general port and L is its label, Φa. is a legal position of the game L∗.
The concept of a metaselection, as well as the concepts unresolved, resolved and
resolvent, for any of the eight sorts of gates, transfer from Section 7 to the present section
without any changes. And metatruth (Definition 7.2) is now redefined as follows:
Definition 8.2. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ an interpretation, Γ a legal run of C, and ~f a
metaselection for C. In this context, with “metatrue” to be read as “metatrue w.r.t.
(∗,Γ, ~f)”, we say that:
• An (elementary or general) L-port a is metatrue iff Γa. is a ⊤-won run of L∗.18
• A resolved gate (of any of the eight types) is metatrue iff so is its resolvent.
• No unresolved disjunctive gate (of any of the four types) is metatrue.
• Every unresolved conjunctive gate (of any of the four types) is metatrue.
Finally, we say that C is metatrue iff so is its root.
18Note that, if a is an elementary port, then Γa is empty, and saying that such a run is a ⊤-won run of
L∗ is the same as to say that L∗ = ⊤.
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With metatruth (conservatively) redefined this way, the definition of (simply) truth
is literally the same as before (Definition 7.3). So is the Wn component of the game C∗
represented by a cirquent C under an interpretation ∗. Namely, a legal run Γ of C∗ is
considered to be ⊤-won iff C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ).
In certain cases, the elementary versus general status of atoms has no effect on validity.
For instance, the cirquent ¬p∨p is valid, and so can be shown to be (whether in the weak or
in the strong sense) the cirquent ¬P ∨P . The same does not hold for all cirquents though.
An example would be ¬p ∨ (p ∧ p), which is valid but can be shown to be not so (whether
in the strong or in the weak sense) with P instead of p. At this point we can observe the
resource-consciousness of computability logic even when only parallel gates/connectives are
considered: while p and p ∧ p are “the same”, P and P ∧ P (or P ∨ P ) are not so at all: P
stands for what will evolve as a single play of game P ∗ (whatever interpretation ∗ we have
in mind), whereas P ∧ P stands for what will evolve as two parallel plays of P ∗ — that is,
plays on two boards. While the game played on either board in the latter case is the same
P ∗, the actual runs on the two boards will not necessarily be the same (unless both players
are making exactly the same moves on the two boards), so that, it may well happen that
the play on one board is won while on the other board is lost. Generally, winning P ∧P for
⊤ is harder than winning P , and winning P is harder than winning P ∨ P . The situation
is very different from this one with elementary atoms instead of general atoms: p is indeed
“the same” as p ∧ p (otherwise computability logic would not be a conservative extension
of classical logic). That is because p∗ is an elementary game with no moves, and hence it
makes no difference whether it is “played” on one board or two boards: all of its “plays”
will be identical, and hence either all of them will be won or all of them will be lost.
As an aside, the phenomenon of resource-consciousness, in a certain way, can be ob-
served in pure IF logic as well. For instance, the two formulas ∀xE(x) and ∀x
(
E(x)∨E(x)
)
can be seen to be non-equivalent there, with E(x) abbreviating ∃y/x(x = y). (Hint: to see
this, consider a model whose domain contains exactly two objects.) IF logic and resource
logics are thus interrelated, and this fact serves as additional evidence in favor of the idea
of studying them within a common general framework, such as the one elaborated in the
present paper.
Earlier we pointed out the increase in expressive power of the formalism of computability
logic achieved by switching from formulas to cirquents. Such a switch has an even more
dramatic impact on expressive power when, along with elementary atoms, general atoms are
also allowed. As we remember, finite cirquents with only ∧ and ∨ gates and only elementary
ports are not any more expressive than formulas are. The same is no the case for cirquents
with general ports though. To get a feel of this, let us compare the two cirquents of
Figure 18, the only difference between which is that one (on the right) has general ports
where the other has elementary ports. Here and later, following our earlier practice, node
IDs are omitted in these figures. Also as agreed earlier, omitted cluster IDs indicate that
clustering is trivial. i.e., all clusters are singletons. Finally, omitted rank indicators should
be understood as that all ∨-clusters are in the lowest rank and all ∧-clusters are in the
highest rank, even though this is, in fact, irrelevant: in the absence of nonsingleton clusters,
ranking can be seen to be redundant, and how it is chosen has no effect on the semantics
of the cirquent.
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Figure 18: Elementary versus general ports
The left cirquent of Figure 18 can be turned into an equivalent tree in the standard way
(duplicate and separate shared nodes), yielding the formula (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ r).
Everything is classical here, that is. The same trick fails for the right cirquent though. It
represents a game played on three boards where ⊤, in order to win, should win on (at least)
two out of the three boards. So, the cirquent that we see there is by no means equivalent
to (P ∧ Q) ∨ (P ∧ R) ∨ (Q ∧ R): the latter represents a game on six (rather than three)
boards grouped into three pairs where, in order to win, ⊤ needs to win on both boards
of at least one pair. This is a “two out of six” combination, which is generally easier to
win than the “two out of three” combination represented by the cirquent under question.
There is simply no tree-like cirquent (formula) extensionally identical, or equivalent in any
reasonable weaker sense, to the right cirquent of Figure 18, meaning that expressing the
game operation represented by it essentially requires the ability to account for sharing —
the ability absent in formula-based languages. In our cirquent, each of the ports is shared
between two conjunctive parents. What makes the formula (P ∧ Q) ∨ (P ∧ R) ∨ (Q ∧ R)
inadequate is that, for instance, it fails to indicate that the two occurrences of P stand for
the same copy of game P rather than two copies of the same game P . And, as pointed out
earlier, two copies of P are semantically not the same as just one copy.
Now we are done with defining ever more general concepts of cirquents and setting up a
CoL semantics for them. The next natural step in this line of research would be elaborating
deductive systems that adequately axiomatize the sets of valid cirquents. Of course, this is
only possible for various subclasses of cirquents rather than all cirquents. A modest progress
in this direction has already been made in [22] where a cirquent-based sound and complete
system19 was constructed. The cirquents of the language of that system have only general
ports, only ∧ and ∨ gates and, of course, no clustering and ranking.
At the formula level, very considerable advances have already been made in the direc-
tion of axiomatizing the sets of valid principles ([13]-[15], [18]-[21], [23]-[26], [27], [32]). For
instance, [27] contains a sound and complete axiomatization for the propositional fragment
of CoL with both elementary and general atoms, negation and all four — parallel, choice,
sequential and toggling — sorts of conjunctions and disjunctions. Certain first-order frag-
ments of CoL have also found sound and complete axiomatizations. The quantifiers ⊓ ,⊔
turn out to be much better behaved than their classical counterparts and, in a striking
difference from the latter, yield decidable first order logics. See [15], [19].
19Soundness and completeness in [22] was proven with respect to abstract resource semantics rather
than the semantics of computability logic; as we are going to see later, however, these two semantics are
equivalent.
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The present paper makes no axiomatization attempts, leaving this ambitious task for
the future. Instead, we are going to show extensional equivalence between the semantics
of CoL and its companion termed abstract resource semantics. This result can make the
future job of axiomatizing various fragments of CoL significantly easier, as abstract resource
semantics is technically much simpler and more convenient to deal with than the semantics
of computability logic.
9. Abstract resource semantics
Abstract resource semantics (ARS) aims to formally capture our intuitions of resources
and resource management. Resources are symmetric to tasks: what is a resource for the
consumer, is a task for the provider. So, an equally adequate name for ARS would be
“abstract task semantics”.
The concept of an atomic resource in ARS is taken as a basic one without any definition
of its nature. This makes it open to various interpretations which ARS itself, as a general-
purpose tool, does not provide. The semantics of computability logic, treating atoms as
variables over static games, can be seen to be one of many such possible interpretations. As
for compound resources, technically their explication in ARS is given in terms of games. The
formal language that ARS deals with is the same as that of computability logic. Precisely,
in this paper, we let this (otherwise open-ended) language consist of all cirquents in the
(most general) sense of Section 8.
There are two sorts of resources: elementary and general. Intuitively, elementary re-
sources are “reusable” or “unexhaustable” ones, while general resources may or may not be
so. Let us say in achieving a certain goal G you used the fact 2 + 2 = 4 as an (intellectual)
resource. After this usage, 2 + 2 will still be 4, so that the resource will remain equally
available for future usage if needed again. On the other hand, if you also used $20, 000
for achieving G, you may not be able to use the same resource again later. 2 + 2 = 4
is an elementary resource, while $20, 000 is not, which makes the latter a (properly) gen-
eral resource. As we may guess, elementary resources will be represented in our cirquent
formalism through elementary ports, and general resources through general ports.
To get some basic intuitive feel of ARS, and to see why the latter, just like CoL, naturally
calls for switching from formulas to cirquents, let us borrow a discussion from [22]. We are
talking about a vending machine that has slots for 25-cent (25c) coins, with each slot taking
a single coin. Coins can be authentic or counterfeited. Let us instead use the more generic
terms true and false here, as there are various particular situations naturally and inevitably
emerging in the world of resources corresponding to those two opposite values. Below are a
few examples of real-world resources/tasks and the possible meanings of the two semantical
values for them:
• A financial debt, which may (true) or may not (false) be eventually paid.
• An electrical outlet or a battery, which may (true) or not (false) actually have sufficient
power in it.
• A standard task performed by a company’s employee or an AI agent, which, eventually,
may (true) or not (false) be successfully completed.
• A specified amount of computer memory required by a process, which may (true) or not
(false) be available at a given time.
• A promise, which may be kept (true) or broken (false).
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See Section 8 of [16] for detailed elaborations of these intuitions.
Continuing the description of our vending machine, inserting a false coin into a slot fills
the slot up (so that no other coins can be inserted into it until the operation is complete),
but otherwise does not fool the machine into thinking that it has received 25 cents. A candy
costs 50 cents, and the machine will dispense a candy if at least two of its slots receive true
coins. Pressing the “dispense” button while having inserted anything less than 50 cents,
such as a single coin, or one true and two false coins, results in a non-recoverable loss.
Victor has three 25c-coins, and he knows that two of them are true while one is perhaps
false (but he has no way to tell which one is false). Could he get a candy?
The answer depends on how many slots the machine has. Consider two cases: machine
M2 with two slots, and machine M3 with three slots. Victor would have no problem with
M3: he can insert his three coins into the three slots, and the machine, having received
≥ 50c, will dispense a candy. With M2, however, Victor is in trouble. He can try inserting
arbitrary two of his three coins into the two slots of the machine, but there is no guarantee
that one of those two coins is not false, in which case Victor will end up with no candy and
only 25 cents remaining in his pocket.
Both M2 and M3 can be understood as resources — resources turning coins into a
candy. And note that these two resources are not the same: M3 is obviously stronger
(“better”), as it allows Victor to get a candy whereas M2 does not, while, at the same
time, anyone rich enough to be able to make M2 dispense a candy would be able to do the
same with M3 as well. Yet, formulas fail to capture this important difference. M2 and M3
can be written as
R2→ Candy and R3→ Candy,
respectively (with E → F , as always, abbreviating ¬E∨F ): they consume a certain resource
R2 or R3 and produce Candy. What makes M3 stronger than M2 is that the subresource
R3 that it consumes is weaker (easier to supply) than the subresource R2 consumed byM2.
Specifically, with one false and two true coins, Victor is able to satisfy R3 but not R2.
The resource R2 can be represented as the following cirquent:
✧
✧✧
❜
❜❜
25c 25c
∧❥
which, due to being tree-like, can also be adequately written as the formula
25c ∧ 25c.
As for the resource R3, either one of the following two cirquents is an adequate represen-
tation of it, with one of them probably showing the relevant part of the actual physical
circuitry used in M3:
❍❍
❍
✟✟
✟
✟✟
✟
✟✟
✟
❍❍
❍
❍❍
❍
25c 25c 25c
∧❥∧❥ ∧❥
∨❥
Figure 19: Two equivalent cirquents for the resource R3
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∧❥
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Unlike R2, however, R3 cannot be written as a formula, for reasons similar to those that we
saw when discussing Figure 18. 25c∧25c does not fit the bill, for it represents R2 which, as
we already agreed, is not the same as R3. Rewriting one of the above two cirquents — let it
be the one on the right — into an “equivalent” formula in the standard way, by duplicating
and separating shared nodes, results in
(25c ∨ 25c) ∧ (25c ∨ 25c) ∧ (25c ∨ 25c), (9.1)
which is not any more adequate than 25c ∧ 25c. It expresses not R3 but the resource
consumed by a machine with six coin slots grouped into three pairs, where (at least) one
slot in each of the three pairs needs to receive a true coin. Such a machine thus dispenses
a candy for ≥ 75 rather than ≥ 50 cents, which makes Victor’s resources insufficient.
The trouble here, as in the case of the right cirquent of Figure 18, is related to the
inability of formulas to explicitly account for resource sharing or the absence thereof. The
right cirquent of Figure 19 stands for a conjunction of three resources, each conjunct, in
turn, being a disjunction of two subresources of type 25c. However, altogether there are
three rather than six 25c-type subresources, each one being shared between two different
conjuncts of the main resource. Formula (9.1) is inadequate because, for example, it fails to
indicate that the first and the third occurrences of “25c” stand for the same resource while
the second and the fifth (as well as the fourth and the sixth) occurrences stand for another
resource, albeit a resource of the same 25c-type. In yet another attempt to save formulas,
one could try to agree that atoms always stand for individual resources rather than resource
types, then give to the three ports of the right cirquent of Figure 19 three different names
P , Q, R, and represent the cirquent as the formula (P ∨Q)∧ (P ∨R) ∧ (Q ∨R). But then
a crucial piece of information would be lost, specifically the information about all inputs
being of the same type 25c, as opposed to, say, the three different types 25c, 10c, 5c. This
would make it impossible to match Victor’s resources with those inputs.
Thus, any systematic attempt to develop a logic of resources would face the necessity
to go beyond formulas and use a formalism that permits to account for resource sharing,
as our cirquents do. And it is an absolute shame that linear logic, commonly perceived
as “the” logic of resources, does not allow to express such simple and naturally emerging
combinations of resources as the “two out of three” combination expressed by the cirquents
of Figure 19.
The main purpose of a good semantics should be serving as a bridge between the real
world and the otherwise meaningless formal expressions of logic. And, correspondingly, the
value of a semantics should be judged by how successfully it achieves this purpose, which,
in turn, depends on how naturally and adequately it formalizes certain basic intuitions
connecting logic with the outside world. Such intuitions behind abstract resource semantics
have been amply explained and illustrated in Section 8 of [16]. The reader is strongly
recommended to get familiar with that piece of literature in order to appreciate the claim
of abstract resource semantics that it is a “real” semantics of resources, formalizing the
resource philosophy traditionally (and, as argued in [16], somewhat wrongly) associated with
linear logic and its variations. In this paper we are mainly focused on just providing formal
definitions, only occasionally making brief intuitive comments, and otherwise fully relying
on [16] for extended explanations of the intuitions, motivations and philosophy underlying
the semantics. Even though [16] dealt with only a very modest subclass of cirquents in our
present sense, the basic intuitions relevant to our treatment — at the philosophical if not
technical level — were already given there.
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From the technical point of view, ARS is a game semantics and, as such, only differs
from the semantics of CoL in the way it treats atoms. Namely, if in CoL atoms are just
placeholders which (together with the entire cirquent) become games only after an inter-
pretation ∗ is applied to them, ARS treats each atom as an atomic abstract resource in its
own rights, and correspondingly sees the whole cirquent as a resource/task/game in its own
rights, without requiring an interpretation to be applied to it. To repeat, while in CoL a
cirquent C, by itself (without an interpretation) is just a formal expression but not a game,
in ARS every cirquent C is directly seen as a game, which we agree to denote by Cˆ. A
related difference between CoL and ARS is that, in the game C∗ represented by a cirquent
C under a given interpretation ∗, CoL allows moves to be made within the games associated
by ∗ with the general literals of C. In ARS, as noted, such literals stand for atomic entities
and no moves within them can or should be made. On the other hand, ARS has an addi-
tional sort of moves by ⊤, called (resource) allocation. Such a move looks like (a, b), where
a is the ID of a P -port for some general atom P , and b is the ID of a ¬P -port. A condition
here, called the monogamicity condition, is that neither a nor b could have been already
used earlier in any allocation moves. As explained and illustrated in [16], the intuition
behind an allocation move is that of (indeed) allocating one resource to another: a coin
(25c) to a coin-receiving slot (¬25c), a memory (100MB) to a memory-requesting process
(¬100MB), a power source (100w) to a power-consuming utensil (¬100w), an USB-interface
external device (USB) to an USB port of a computer (¬USB), etc. And a justification of
the monogamicity condition is that if a nonelementary resource a is used by (allocated to)
b, then it cannot be also used by (allocated to) another c 6= b.
Formally, an allocation for a given cirquent C is a pair (a, b) — identified with the
expression “(a, b)” — where a and b are (the IDs of) general ports of C such that the label
of a is P (some general atom P ) and the label of b is ¬P .
The set of legal runs of the game associated with a cirquent in ARS is defined as follows:
Definition 9.1. Let C be a cirquent and Φ a position. Φ is a legal position of the game
Cˆ (associated with C in ARS) iff, with “cluster” and “port” below meaning those of C, the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Every labmove of Φ has one of the following forms:
(a) ⊤c.i, where c is a ∨-, ▽- or ⊔-cluster and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of c.
(b) ⊥c.i, where c is a ∧-, △- or ⊓-cluster and i is a positive integer not exceeding the
outdegree of c.
(c) ⊤(a, b), where (a, b) is an allocation for C. This kind of a move is said to be an
allocation move.
(2) Whenever c is a choice cluster, Φ contains at most one occurrence of a labmove of the
form ℘c.i.
(3) Whenever c is a sequential cluster and Φ is of the form 〈. . . , ℘c.i, . . . , ℘c.j, . . .〉, we have
i < j.
(4) Φ does not contain any two occurrences ⊤(a, b) and ⊤(a′, b′) such that a = a′ or b = b′.
By an arrangement for a cirquent C we mean a set A of allocations for C such that,
whenever (a, b), (a′, b′) ∈ A, we have either (a, b) = (a′, b′), or both a 6= a′ and b 6= b′. We
call this condition (on arrangements) the monogamicity condition.
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Whenever C is a cirquent and Γ is a legal run of Cˆ, by the arrangement induced by
Γ we mean the set of all allocations (a, b) such that Γ contains the labmove ⊤(a, b).
By a situation ∗ for a cirquent C we mean an assignment of one of the values T (“true”)
or F (“false”) to each port of C, satisfying the condition that, for any two elementary (but
not necessarily general) ports a and b, whenever a and b have the same label, they are
assigned the same value, and whenever a and b have opposite labels, they are assigned
different values. Any such function ∗ is a legitimate situation, including the cases when ∗
assigns different values to general ports that have identical labels. Intuitively this is perfectly
meaningful in the world of resources because, say, one 25c-port (slot of the vending machine)
may receive a true coin while the other 25c-port may receive a false coin or no coin at all.
Note the difference between situations and interpretations. One difference is that an
interpretation associates with each port a game, while a situation simply sends each port
to one of the values T or F. Of course, in the case of elementary (but by no means general)
ports, this difference is not essential, as T can be identified with the game ⊤ and F with the
game ⊥. Another difference is that the domain of an interpretation is the set of atoms of a
cirquent while the domain of a situation is the set of ports. This is a substantial difference,
as the same atom, with or without a negation, may be the label of many different ports.
But, again, this difference is not relevant if we only consider elementary ports.
Let C be a cirquent, A an arrangement for C, and ∗ a situation for C. We say that ∗
is consistent with A iff, whenever (a, b) ∈ A, the situation ∗ assigns different values to a
and b.20
The concept of a metaselection, as well as the concepts unresolved, resolved and
resolvent, for any of the eight sorts of gates, transfer from Section 8 and hence Section 7 to
the present section without any changes. And metatruth (Definition 8.2) is now redefined
as follows:
Definition 9.2. Let C be a cirquent, ∗ a situation for C, Γ a legal run of Cˆ, and ~f a
metaselection for C. In this context, with “metatrue” to be read as “metatrue w.r.t.
(∗,Γ, ~f)”, we say that:
• An (elementary or general) L-port a is metatrue iff L∗ = T.
• A resolved gate (of any of the eight types) is metatrue iff so is its resolvent.
• No unresolved disjunctive gate (of any of the four types) is metatrue.
• Every unresolved conjunctive gate (of any of the four types) is metatrue.
Finally, we say that C is metatrue iff so is its root.
With metatruth redefined this way, the definition of (simply) truth is literally the same
as before (Definition 7.3).
Next, where C is a cirquent and Γ is a legal run of Cˆ, we say that C is accomplished
w.r.t. Γ iff, for every situation ∗ consistent with the arrangement induced by Γ, C is true
w.r.t. (∗,Γ).
Now, where C is a cirquent and Γ is a legal run of Cˆ, Γ is considered to be a ⊤-won
run of Cˆ iff C is accomplished w.r.t. Γ. This, together with Definition 9.1, completes our
definition of the game Cˆ associated with a cirquent C in ARS.
20In [16], a weaker condition was adopted, according to which at least one (but possibly both) of the
ports a, b should be assigned T. It is easy to see that either condition yields the same concept of validity, so
that this difference is unimportant.
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We say that an HPM M accomplishes a cirquent C iff M wins the game Cˆ. When
such an M exists, the cirquent C is said to be accomplishable.
Accomplishability is the main semantical concept of ARS. In its philosophical spirit, it
is an ARS-counterpart of the classical concept of truth. Technically, however, it is more a
validity- (rather than truth-) style concept. Namely, it is similar to the concept of strong
validity of computability logic.
To see an example, consider the cirquent of Figure 20.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
P P P P ¬P ¬P ¬P ¬P
❅ ❦∨
❅ ❦∨
❦∧
❳❳❳ ✘✘✘
❅ ❦∨
❅ ❦∨
❦∧
❳❳❳ ✘✘✘
❤❤❤❤
❤❤
✭✭✭✭
✭✭
❦∨
Figure 20: An accomplishable cirquent
And consider two HPMs M1 and M2 such that:
M1 generates the run Γ1 = 〈⊤(1, 5),⊤(2, 6),⊤(3, 7),⊤(4, 8)〉;
M2 generates the run Γ2 = 〈⊤(1, 5),⊤(2, 7),⊤(3, 6),⊤(4, 8)〉.
Then M1 does not accomplish the cirquent while M2 does.
Indeed, the arrangement induced by Γ1 is
A1 = {(1, 5), (2, 6), (3, 7), (4, 8)}.
Let † be the situation with
1† = 2† = 7† = 8† = T; 3† = 4† = 5† = 6† = F.
Then † is consistent with A1. But the cirquent is false w.r.t. (
†,Γ1). Hence it is not
accomplished w.r.t. Γ1. Hence M1 does not accomplish it.
The above situation †, on the other hand, is not consistent with the arrangement
A2 = {(1, 5), (2, 7), (3, 6), (4, 8)}
induced by Γ2. Moreover, with some thought, one can see that no situation that makes the
cirquent of Figure 20 false can be consistent with A2. This means that M2, unlike M1,
does accomplish that cirquent.
As an aside, the cirquent of Figure 20 is tree-like and hence can be written as the
formula
(
(P ∨P )∧(P ∨P )
)
∨
(
(¬P ∨¬P )∧(¬P ∨¬P )
)
. This formula, first brought forward
by Blass [2] in a related context, is not provable in multiplicative linear logic or even in the
extension of the latter known as affine logic. The same applies to the more general principle(
(P ∨Q)∧(R∨S)
)
∨
(
(¬P ∨¬R)∧(¬Q∨¬S)
)
. Thus, unlike the situation with classical logic
or IF logic, the logic induced by ARS or by (the extensionally equivalent) computability
logic is not a conservative extension of linear logic or its standard variations such as affine
logic. It is this fact that makes CoL and ARS believe that linear logic is incomplete as a
logic of resources.
The cirquent of Figure 21 looks very “similar” to the cirquent of Figure 20. Yet, unlike
the latter, it is not accomplishable. As an exercise, the reader may want to try to understand
why this is so.
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Figure 21: An unaccomplishable cirquent
To see the difference that sharing general ports may create, compare the two cirquents of
Figure 22. The left cirquent can be seen to be unaccomplishable. The right cirquent only
differs from the left cirquent in that ports 6 and 7 are combined together into one port 8 and
shared between the two parents. This “minor” change makes it accomplishable. Namely, it
is accomplished by an HPM that makes the three moves (8, 1), (4, 2) and (5, 3) in whatever
order, i.e., sets up the arrangement {(8, 1), (4, 2), (5, 3)}.
1 2 6 7 3 4 5 1 2 8 3 4 5
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Figure 22: Unshared versus shared general ports
Again very briefly about the intuitions behind ARS, elaborated through several papers
([11, 16, 22, 23]). Situations are full descriptions of the world in terms of what is true and
what is false. What the “actual” situation is, is typically unknown to an agent (HPM)
trying to accomplish a certain task (cirquent). Furthermore, the truth values of atoms may
simply be indetermined before or during the process of playing the game associated with
the cirquent, and can be influenced by what moves have been made. For instance, if p
stands for “Victor has (or will) become a millionaire in his lifetime”, the truth value of p
may eventually depend on how Victor acts towards achieving p as a goal. This value is
initially indetermined, for otherwise all Victor’s activities would be meaningless. It will
become determined only by the time when Victor dies of when the world ends.
Playing a game represented by a cirquent in ARS can be seen as resource or task
management. The goal is to make sure that the eventual (“actual”) situation which will
determine success and over which the agent only has partial control, is favorable for the
agent (guarantees a win). Resource management includes allocation decisions. The effect of
each such decision/move is narrowing down the set of all possible (and otherwise unknown)
situations. For instance, allocating a coin to a slot of a vending machine rules out the
situation (by making it inconsistent with the arrangement that is being set up) in which
the coin is true yet the slot did not receive 25c. Resource management also includes decision-
style actions associated with selectional gates or clusters. For instance, a choice between
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a candy and an apple that a vending machine offers to whoever inserts 50c into it is a
⊓-combination of Candy and Apple (this is so from the machine’s perspective; it becomes
an ⊔-combination from the user’s perspective). And nature’s “decisions” about whether
Victor lives or dies is a ▽-style combination of “Victor is alive” and “Victor is dead”, where
nature can switch from the former to the latter but never back, as required by the game
rules associated with sequential combinations. In Section 5 we further saw resource/task
intuitions associated with clustering. Remember the “Victor and Peggy in the middle of
the road” example.
Historical remarks. A year before computability logic was officially born, paper [11]
introduced an approach termed the logic of tasks which, ignoring certain unessential and
flexible technical details, eventually became a conservative fragment and an ideological pre-
decessor of both CoL and ARS. In our present terms, the language of the logic of tasks was
limited to only elementary atoms (an important detail!) and formulas (tree-like cirquents)
built from them using ∧,∨,⊓,⊔ in both propositional and quantifier forms. For these sorts
of cirquents, the concept of validity defined in [11] coincides with our present ARS con-
cept of accomplishability, as well as with our present CoL concept of strong validity. The
above-sketched philosophical vision of the world as a set of potential situations, with the
game-playing agent trying to reduce that set to favorable ones, also was originally developed
within the framework of the logic of tasks. While the logic of tasks is being further studied
by a number of researchers ([36], [39], [40]), the author himself abandoned it as an approach
superseded by the more general computability logic.
The idea of abstract resource semantics in the proper sense (the sense that differentiates
it from the more limited logic of tasks), as well as the idea of cirquents, was born in
[16]. Central to this idea was considering allocations as moves in their own rights and,
correspondingly, considering in the language general atoms instead of — or, rather, along
with — the elementary atoms of the logic of tasks. Cirquents that [16] officially dealt with
were very limited, with the root always being a ∧-gate, the children of the root always being
∨-gates, and all grandchildren of the root being general ports. The same paper, however,
outlined the possibility and expediency of considering more general sorts of cirquents and
correspondingly extending the associated abstract resource semantics.
The paper [22] generalized the cirquents of [16] and the corresponding abstract resource
semantics to all finite ∧,∨-cirquents with general ports. And the paper [23] outlined ARS
in more or less full generality, even though for formulas only. Within that outline, Mezhirov
and Vereshchagin [32] undertook a detailed study of propositional formulas in the logical
signature {¬,∧,∨,⊓,⊔, ∧| , ∨| }, and proved a theorem similar to our forthcoming Theorem
10.1. The main novelty in the present extension of ARS is the idea of clustering, never
considered before in either CoL or ARS. In fact, as noted earlier, cirquents, in whatever
form, had never been used in CoL (as opposed to ARS) as official means of expression.
And ARS only had been defined for selectional-gate-free cirquents without clustering and
ranking.
Before closing this section, we want to summarize what we have already said or what
the reader has probably already observed. From the technical (as opposed to, perhaps,
philosophical) point of view, when cirquents with only elementary ports are considered,
there is no difference between ARS and the semantics of CoL, as long as, in the latter, we
limit our attention only to the concept of strong validity. And the above-mentioned logic
of tasks is a fragments of this common part of CoL and ARS. So is classical logic, IF logic
or extended IF logic. ARS and the semantics of CoL start to differ only when we consider
48 G. JAPARIDZE
cirquents with general ports. This difference is substantial, yet only in the intensional sense.
The following section shows the nontrivial fact that extensionally there is no difference —
that is, the two semantics, despite differences, still yield the same classes of valid cirquents.
10. Accomplishability and strong validity are equivalent
By a nice game we shall mean a game G such that, with ℘ (as always) standing for either
player and ¬℘ for the other player, we have:
• Every legal run of G is either 〈〉 or 〈℘m〉 or 〈℘m,¬℘n〉, where m,n are (the decimal
representations of) some positive integers.
• The empty run 〈〉 is won by ⊤, and a legal run 〈℘m〉 of G is won by ℘.
• A legal run 〈⊤m,⊥n〉 of G is ℘-won iff so is 〈⊥n,⊤m〉. This allows us to see legal runs
of nice games as sets rather than sequences of labmoves, and write {⊤m,⊥n} instead of
〈⊤m,⊥n〉.
Thus, different nice games differ from each other only in which runs of the form {⊤m,⊥n}
are won.
By a nice interpretation we shall mean an interpretation that interprets each general
atom as a nice game.
This section is entirely devoted to a proof of the following theorem. In it, as always,
a “cirquent” means a cirquent in the most general sense defined so far, i.e., in the sense of
Section 8.
Theorem 10.1. C is strongly valid iff C is accomplishable (any cirquent C).
Furthermore, both the “if” and “only if” parts of this theorem come in the following
strong forms, respectively:
1. There is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary HPM M and constructs an
HPM U such that, if M accomplishes C, then U is a uniform solution for C.
2. If C is not accomplishable, then, for any HPM U , there is a nice interpretation ∗
such that U does not win C∗.
Before getting down to a proof of this theorem, we need to agree on certain additional
details about the (otherwise loosely defined in Section 2) HPM model of computation.
Namely, we assume that either tape of an HPM has a beginning but no end, with cells
arranged in the left-to-right order. We also assume that, at any computation step, an HPM
can make at most one move, whereas its environment can make any finite number of moves.
When both players move, the order in which their moves are appended to the content of the
run tape is that ⊤’s move goes before ⊥’s moves. By a run generated by a given HPM H
we mean any run that might be (depending on the environment’s behavior) incrementally
spelled on the run tape of H during its work. Thus, H wins a game A iff every run generated
by H is a ⊤-won run of A.
Proof of clause 1. Consider an arbitrary cirquent C, and an arbitrary HPM M. Our
goal is to construct an HPM U such that, as long as M accomplishes C, U wins C∗ for
any interpretation ∗.
Understanding the idea behind our proof is not hard. We let U be a machine which,
as far as moves associated with selectional clusters are concerned, acts the same way in C∗
— i.e., makes the same selections — as M does in the game Cˆ associated with C in ARS.
The machines U andM only differ from each other in their actions related to general ports.
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The strategy of U in general ports is that, as long as M has not allocated a given port to
another one (or vice versa), U makes no moves in it. However, as soon as two general ports
a and b are allocated to each other by M, U starts applying copycat between the games
(one being the negation of the other) associated with those ports, i.e., mimicking in either
game the environment’s moves made in the other game. As a result, the plays (runs) of the
games associated with a and b are guaranteed to be symmetric. More precisely, one is a
⊤-delay of the other. This makes it impossible that both of those plays are lost by ⊤. We
may assume that exactly one of them is won by ⊤ (if both are won, “even better”). Then,
translating “lost” into the value F and “won” into the value T, we get a situation ‡ for C
consistent with the arrangement induced by the run Θ generated byM. IfM accomplishes
C, the latter is true with respect to (‡,Θ). Then the game C∗ can be easily seen to be won
by U .
In more technical detail, U works by simulatingM. For this simulation, at any step, U
maintains a record Configuration for the “current” configuration ofM. The latter contains
the “current” state of M, the locations of the two scanning heads of M, and full contents
of the (imaginary) work and run tapes of M. Initially, the state is the start state of M,
the two scanning heads are looking at the leftmost cells of their tapes, and the contents of
the two tapes are empty. U also maintains a variable i which is initially set to 1.
After the above initialization step, U just acts according to the following procedure:
Procedure LOOP:
(1) Using the transition function of M and based on the current value of Configuration, U
computes the next state, next locations of the scanning heads, the next content of the
work tape of M, and correspondingly updates Configuration.
(2) If during the above transition M made a move ω, U further updates Configuration by
appending the labmove ⊤ω to the content of the imaginary run tape ofM. In addition:
(a) If ω is not an allocation move, U makes the same move ω in the real play.
(b) Suppose now ω is an allocation move (a, b). Let Υ be the longest initial segment
of the position spelled on the run tape of U such that the last labmove of Υ, as a
string spelled on the tape, ends at location j (i.e., the last symbol of the labmove is
written in the jth cell) for some j < i. Then U looks up, within (but not beyond)
Υ, all the labmoves ⊥a.β1, . . . ,⊥a.βn of the form ⊥a.β, and makes the moves
b.β1, . . . , b.βn in the real play. Similarly, it looks up within Υ all the labmoves
⊥b.α1, . . . ,⊥b.αm of the form ⊥b.α, and makes the moves a.α1, . . . , a.αm.
(3) Now U checks its run tape to see whether it contains a labmove ⊥ω which, as a string
spelled on the tape, ends exactly at location i. If such an ω is found, then:
(a) If ω looks like c.j where c is a selectional cluster, U further updates Configuration
by adding the labmove ⊥ω to the content of the imaginary run tape of M.
(b) If ω looks like a.δ where a is a general port already allocated by M to a certain
port b (or vice versa) — i.e., the imaginary run tape of M contains the labmove
⊤(a, b) or ⊤(b, a) — then U makes the move b.δ in the real play.
(4) Finally, M increments i to i+ 1, and repeats LOOP.
Assume M accomplishes C.
Consider an arbitrary run Γ generated by U . To this run corresponds a run Θ generated
byM — namely, Θ is the run incrementally spelled on the imaginary run tape of M when
the latter is simulated by U during playing according to the scenario of Γ. Fix these Γ
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and Θ. Let us also fix A as the arrangement induced by Θ. We further pick an arbitrary
interpretation ∗ and fix it, too.
Our assumption that M accomplishes C implies that M never makes an illegal move
of Cˆ (unless its adversary does so first). We may also safely assume that U ’s environment
never makes illegal moves of C∗ either, for otherwise U automatically wins and we are done.
Then a little analysis of the situation reveals that Γ is a legal run of C∗ and Θ is a legal
run of Cˆ. We will implicitly rely on this observation in our further argument.
Consider an arbitrary pair (a, b) with (a, b) ∈ A. Let P be the label of a, and thus ¬P
the label of b. Remember that Γa. is the run that took place (according to the scenario of
Γ) in the copy of the game P ∗ associated with a and, similarly, Γb. is the run that took
place in the copy of the game ¬P ∗ associated with b. Remember also that, for a run Ω, ¬Ω
means the result of negating all labels in Ω. It is clear from our description of LOOP that
Γa. is a ⊤-delay of ¬Γb.. Assume Γb. is a ⊤-lost run of ¬P ∗. Then, by the definition of the
game negation operation, ¬Γb. is a ⊤-won run of P ∗. But then, because P ∗ is a static game
and Γa. is a ⊤-delay of ¬Γb., Γa. is a ⊤-won run of P ∗. To summarize, we have:
Suppose (a, b) ∈ A, and P and ¬P are the labels of a and b. Then
either Γa. is a ⊤-won run of P ∗, or Γb. is a ⊤-won run of ¬P ∗, or both.
(10.1)
We define a situation † for C by stipulating that, for any elementary or general L-port c of
C, c† = T iff Γc. is a ⊤-won run of L∗.
From our description of the work of U it is clear that M and U act in exactly the same
ways in the selectional clusters of C. That is, Γ and Θ contain exactly the same labmoves
of the form ℘c.j where c is a selectional cluster. From this observation and our choice of †,
with a little thought, we can see that:
C is true w.r.t. (†,Θ) iff C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ). (10.2)
Let ‡ be the situation for C that agrees with † in all cases except that, whenever
(a, b) ∈ A and a† = b† = T, we have a‡ = T and b‡ = F. In view of the monotonicity of the
truth conditions associated with all types of gates, it is clear that
If C is true w.r.t. (‡,Θ), then C is also true w.r.t. (†,Θ). (10.3)
Consider any (a, b) ∈ A. By our choice of ‡, it is impossible that a‡ = b‡ = T. And,
with (10.1) in mind, it is also impossible that a‡ = b‡ = F. Thus, ‡ assigns different values
to a and b. This means that
‡ is consistent with A. (10.4)
Since M accomplishes C, in view of (10.4), C is true w.r.t. (‡,Θ). But then, by (10.3)
and (10.2), C is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ), meaning that Γ is a ⊤-won run of C∗. But remember
that Γ was an arbitrary run generated by U and ∗ was an arbitrary interpretation. Thus,
U is a uniform solution for C. It remains to make the straightforward observation that, as
promised in the theorem, our construction of U from M is effective.
Proof of clause 2. Our proof here is in many respects symmetric to the proof of clause
1.
Consider an arbitrary cirquent C, and an arbitrary HPM U such that U wins C∗ for
any nice interpretation ∗. Our goal is to construct an HPM M such that M accomplishes
C.
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To understand the idea behind our proof, imagine a play of U over C∗ for whatever
nice interpretation ∗, on which, note, the behavior of U does not depend. Every (legal)
move in this play signifies either a move made in a selectional cluster, or a move made in a
general port. Since ∗ is nice, for each general port, either player has exactly one move that
can be made there. Let us call U ’s environment smart if it always makes different moves in
different general ports. This is the case when, say, the environment always makes the move
“a” in port a. Let us assume that, in the play that we are considering, the environment
is smart. The best that then U can do is to match each P -labeled port with one (but not
more!) ¬P -labeled port — match in the sense of mimicking adversary’s moves so that the
two games evolve in a symmetric fashion, to guarantee that at least one of them will be
eventually won. Each time such a “matching” between ports a and b is detected, we let
M make a move that allocates a to b. Other than this, M plays in the same way as U
does, by making the same moves (selections) in selectional clusters as U makes. We can
then show that, if M does not accomplish C with this strategy, any falsifying situation †
for C translates into certain conditions on ∗ under which U has lost C∗. This, however, is
impossible because, by our assumption, U wins C∗ for any nice interpretation ∗.
In more detailed terms,M works by simulating U . For this simulation, at any step,M
maintains a record Configuration for the “current” configuration of U . The latter contains
the “current” state of U , the locations of the two scanning heads of U , and full contents of
the (imaginary) work and run tapes of U . Initially, the state is the start state of U , the two
scanning heads are looking at the leftmost cells of their tapes, and the contents of the two
tapes are empty. M also maintains a variable i which is initially set to 1.
After the above initialization step, M just acts according to the following procedure:
Procedure LOOP:
(1) Using the transition function of U and based on the current value of Configuration, M
computes the next state, next locations of the scanning heads, the next content of the
work tape of U , and correspondingly updates Configuration.
(2) If during the above transition U made a move ω, M further updates Configuration by
appending the labmove ⊤ω to the content of the imaginary run tape of U . In addition,
if ω looks like c.j for some selectional cluster c, M makes the same move ω in the real
play.
(3) If i is (the ID of) a general port, M further updates Configuration by appending the
labmove ⊥i.i (a “smart environment’s” move) to the content of the imaginary run tape
of U .
(4) Next, M checks if there is a pair (a, b) of opposite general ports with a positive and b
negative, such that the imaginary run tape of U contains the four labmoves ⊥a.a, ⊥b.b,
⊤b.a, ⊤a.b, and M has not yet made the allocation move (a, b) in the real play. This
is to what we earlier referred as “detecting a match between a and b”. If such a pair
(a, b) is found, M makes the move (a, b) in the real play.
(5) Now M checks its run tape to see whether it contains a labmove ⊥ω which, as a string
spelled on the tape, ends at location i. If such an ω is found and it looks like c.j where
c is a selectional cluster, M further updates Configuration by appending ⊥ω to the
content of the imaginary run tape of U .
(6) Finally, M increments i to i+ 1, and repeats LOOP.
Consider an arbitrary run Θ generated byM. To this run corresponds a run Γ generated
by U — namely, Γ is the run incrementally spelled on the imaginary run tape of U when
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the latter is simulated by M during playing according to the scenario of Θ. Fix these Θ
and Γ. Let us also fix A as the arrangement induced by Θ. We further pick an arbitrary
situation † for C consistent with A and fix it, too.
Our assumption that U wins C∗ for any nice interpretation ∗ implies that U never makes
an illegal move of C∗ (unless its environment does so first). We may also safely assume that
M’s adversary never makes illegal moves of Cˆ either, for otherwise M automatically wins
and we are done. Then, a little analysis of the situation reveals that Θ is a legal run of Cˆ
and Γ is a legal run of C∗ (for whatever nice interpretation ∗). We will implicitly rely on
this observation in our further argument.
We shall say that a general port a of C is unmatched iff for no b does A contain (a, b)
or (b, a). Otherwise a is matched, and the port b for which A contains (a, b) or (b, a) is
said to be the match of a.
Let ‡ be the situation for C which agrees with † on all elementary and matched general
ports, and sends each unmatched general port to F. Obviously ‡, just like †, is consistent
with A. And, as † sends to T any port that ‡ does, in view of the monotonicity of all truth
conditions associated with gates, it is clear that
If C is true w.r.t. (‡,Θ), then so is it w.r.t. (†,Θ). (10.5)
We now choose a nice interpretation ∗ such that:
• For any elementary atom p, p∗ = ⊤ iff there is a p-labeled (resp. ¬p-labeled) port a such
that a‡ = T (resp. a‡ = F).
• For any general atom P , P ∗ is the nice game such that any legal run {⊥a,⊤b} of it is
⊤-won iff we have one of the following:
(1) a is a P -port with a‡ = T, and Γa. = {⊥a,⊤b}.
(2) b is a ¬P -port with b‡ = F, and Γb. = {⊤a,⊥b}.
We claim the following:
For any general L-port c of C, c‡ = T iff Γc. is a ⊤-won run of L∗. (10.6)
To verify the above claim, let us first consider the case when L = P (some general atom
P ) and c‡ = T. Since ‡ assigns T only to matched general ports, c is matched. Let d be the
match of c. From our description of the work ofM it is obvious that Γc. = {⊥c,⊤d}. And,
by clause 1 of our definition of P ∗, such a run is a ⊤-won run of P ∗, as desired.
Next, consider the case when L = ¬P and c‡ = T. Again, since ‡ assigns T only
to matched general ports, c is matched. Let d be its match. So, d‡ = F. Note that
Γc. = {⊤d,⊥c} and hence ¬Γc. = {⊥d,⊤c}. By our definition of P ∗, {⊥d,⊤c} can be a
⊤-won run of P ∗ only if either d‡ = T (clause 1) or c‡ = F (clause 2). But neither of these
two is true in our case. So, ¬Γc. is a ⊥-won run of P ∗. But then, by the definition of game
negation, Γc. is a ⊤-won run of ¬P ∗, as desired.
Next, consider the case when L = P and c‡ = F. Since the smart adversary of (the
simulated by M) U makes the move c.c for each general port c, Γc. contains the labmove
⊥c. If it does not contain any other labmoves, Γc. is a ⊥-won run of P ∗ because the latter
is a nice game. Suppose now Γc. = {⊥c,⊤d} for some d. So, either c is unmatched, or d its
match. If c is unmatched, then Γd. cannot be {⊥d,⊤c} and hence, by our definition of P ∗,
Γc. is not a ⊤-won run of P ∗. Now suppose d is the match of c. Then d‡ = T which, again,
makes it impossible that Γc. is a ⊤-won run of P ∗. Thus, in all cases, Γc. is a ⊥-won run of
P ∗, as desired.
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Finally, consider the case when L = ¬P and c‡ = F. As in the previous case, Γc.
contains the labmove ⊥c. Hence, ¬Γc. contains ⊤c. If ¬Γc. does not contain any other
labmoves, ¬Γc. is a ⊤-won run of P ∗ because P ∗ is a nice game; then, Γc. is a ⊥-won run of
¬P ∗, and we are done. Suppose now ¬Γc. = {⊥d,⊤c} for some d, and hence Γc. = {⊤d,⊥c}.
Then, by clause 2 of our definition of P ∗, ¬Γc. is a ⊤-won run of P ∗, meaning that Γc. is a
⊥-won run of ¬P ∗, as desired. Claim (10.6) is now proven.
By our choice of ∗, claim (10.6) is automatically true for elementary ports instead of
general ports. So, we have:
For any (elementary or general) L-port c of C, c‡ = T iff Γc. is a ⊤-won run of L∗.
(10.7)
From our description of the work ofM one can see thatM and U act in exactly the same
ways in selectional clusters. More precisely, Θ and Γ contain exactly the same labmoves of
the form ℘c.j where c is a selectional cluster of C. From this observation, in conjunction
with (10.7), it is obvious that C is true w.r.t. (‡,Θ) iff it is true w.r.t. (∗,Γ). But, by our
assumption, U wins C∗ for any nice interpretation C∗. Thus, C is true w.r.t. (‡,Θ). Then,
by (10.5), C is also true w.r.t. (†,Θ). Now, remembering that † was an arbitrary situation
consistent with the arrangement induced by Θ, we find that C is accomplished w.r.t. Θ.
In other words, Θ is a ⊤-won run of Cˆ. Finally, remembering that Θ was an arbitrary run
generated by M, we conclude that M wins Cˆ. In other words, M accomplishes C.
11. Conclusion
We have elaborated circuit-style constructs called cirquents, and set up two sorts of game
semantics for them: the semantics of computability logic, and abstract resource semantics.
The two, while substantially different, have been proven to validate the same classes of
cirquents.
Cirquents, allowing us to account for sharing substructures between different parent
structures, are properly more expressive and efficient means of representing various objects
of study than formulas are. This fact had already been observed in the past, but only very
limited classes of cirquents had been studied so far, and only abstract resource semantics
(not the semantics of computability logic) had been defined for them. The present paper
extended the earlier studied cirquents by adding three non-traditional pairs of conjunctive
and disjunctive gates to them. An even more important innovation was generalizing gates to
what we called clusters. This is a generalization naturally called for by advanced approaches
to game logics and resource logics. Clustering further increases the expressiveness and flex-
ibility of cirquents. Among its merits is achieving the full expressive power of independence
friendly logic and far beyond.
This paper has been exclusively focused on semantics. Among the subsequent natural
steps within the present line of research would be attempts to construct deductive systems
for various fragments of the set of valid cirquents.
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